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in its enforcement
tore 47,000 windows out of hellhole
shelter of no light.
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INTRODUCTION
Poverty in America is a tragedy of longstanding. I Magnified by the cruel
spread of hunger and homelessness, it is a tragedy gaining resonance in the
daily lives of an increasing number of Americans.2 Recognizing this growing
calamity, many poverty lawyers have redoubled their efforts.3 Others, given
pause for reflection, have attempted to amplify traditionally unheard client
1. See M. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WEL-
FARE IN AMERICA (1986) [hereinafter IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE]; M. HARRIN-
TON, THE NEW AMERICAN POVERTY (1984); M. KATZ, POVERTY AND POLICY IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (1983); S. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR FOR THE 1980s (1980); F.
PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY
FAIL 41-95 (1977) [hereinafter POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS]; F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 3-79 (1971) [hereinafter REG-
ULATING THE POOR]; M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962).
2. The accretion of hunger in America is well-documented by the Physician Task Force on
Hunger. See PHYSICIAN TASK FORCE ON HUNGER IN AMERICA, HUNGER REACHES BLUE
COLLAR AMERICA: AN UNBALANCED RECOVERY IN A SERVICE ECONOMY (1987); PHYSI-
CIAN TASK FORCE ON HUNGER IN AMERICA, INCREASING HUNGER AND DECLINING HELP:
BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION IN THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM (1986); PHYSICIAN TASK
FORCE ON HUNGER IN AMERICA, HUNGER COUNTIES 1986 - THE DISTRIBUTION OF
AMERICA'S HIGH-RISK AREAS (1986); PHYSICIAN TASK FORCE ON HUNGER IN AMERICA,
HUNGER IN AMERICA: THE GROWING EPIDEMIC (1985). Cf UNITED STATES GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, HUNGER COUNTIES: METHODOLOGICAL REVIEW OF A REPORT BY THE
PHYSICIAN TASK FORCE ON HUNGER (1986) (challenging methods of defining and measuring
hunger population).
A comparable uptrend in homelessness is reported from many quarters, notably among
families and the mentally disabled. See Marcin, Homelessness: A Commentary and a Bibliogra-
phy, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PUBLIC POL'Y 203 (1988); J. KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER
CHILDREN: HOMELESS FAMILIES IN AMERICA (1988); Hombs, SocialRecognition of the Home-
less: Policies of Indifference, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 143 (1987); Kanter, Homc-
less Mentally Ill People: No Longer Out of Sight and Out of Mind, 3 N.Y.L. ScH. HUM. RTs.
ANN. 331 (1986).
The confluence of these factors, coupled with age, disability, gender, race, and more com-
mon economic variables, may account for the tenacity of poverty. See Sawhill, Poverty in the
U.S.: Why Is It So Persistent?, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 1073 (1988); A. DEHAVENON, THE TYRANNY
OF INDIFFERENCE AND THE RE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HUNGER, HOMELESSNESS AND
POOR HEALTH (1987); A DEMOCRATIC STAFF STUDY PREPARED FOR THE JOINT ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, THE GROWTH IN POVERTY: 1979-1985 (1986); NA-
TIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LAW CENTER, PROFILES OF THE POVERTY POPULATION 1970-
1980 (1984). See also Papers and Proceedings: The Feminization of Poverty, 78 AM. ECON.
REV. 81 (1988); Quinn & Linden, Social Science Support and Legal Services, 21 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 970 (1988); Caro & Wicks, Quantitative Research on Poverty Issues: A Review of
National Social Science and Law Center Analytic Casework, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 970
(1986); O'Hare, Measuring Poverty, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 648 (1981).
For an oral history documenting the manifold experience of poverty, see L. DUNBAR, THE
COMMON INTEREST: How OUR SOCIAL-WELFARE POLICIES DON'T WORK, AND WHAT WE
CAN Do ABOUT THEM (1988); S. TERKEL, HARD TIMES: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE GREAT
DEPRESSION (1970); J. AGEE & W. EVANS, LET Us Now PRAISE FAMOUS MEN (1939).
3. See Hayes, Litigating on Behalf of Shelter for the Poor, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79
(1987); Blasi, Litigation on Behalf of the Homeless: Systematic Approaches, 31 WASH. U.J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 137 (1987); Woodward, Homelessness: A Legal Activist Analysis of Judicial and
Street Strategies, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 251 (1986); Langdon & Kass, Homelessness
in America: Looking for the Right to Shelter, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 305 (1985). See
also Bassuk, Redefining Transitional Housing for Homeless Families, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
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voices.4 Still others have fallen silent, succumbing to resignation and aban-
doning the enterprise altogether.'
I submit that the best of these responses are inadequate. While reflection,
diversity, and heightened commitment are essential to combat poverty, with-
out more these efforts are destined to fail. To prevail, even to progress, in the
battle against poverty, lawyers must rethink their efforts. By rethinking, I do
not mean simply a methodological inquiry concerning litigation tactics - in-
dividual versus class relief - and strategy - direct service versus law reform.
That inquiry, though legitimate, patently illustrates the crisis in the definition
of the subject of poverty law itself.6
By definition, the subject of poverty law is the poor. It is the poor who
experience the objective force of poverty and the deprivation of powerlessness.
Yet, the poor are not empowered by the dominant traditions of poverty law,
nor are they liberated from the desperate conditions of poverty. This histori-
cal quandary warrants a recasting of our conceptual and methodological un-
derstanding of poverty law.7 Recasting is an ideological project.
The crisis in poverty law therefore is at bottom ideological. It is a crisis
of the legal imagination uprooted from history, an imagination blind to cul-
ture and society. Fundamentally, the crisis in poverty law lies in its politics.
Bereft of social theory, it is a politics of historical entropy empowering neither
309 (1988); Mascari, Homeless Families: Do They Hare a Right to Integrity?, 35 UCLA L REv.
159 (1987).
Commentators have urged tying these efforts explicitly to community empowerment, see
Dorsey, Survival v. Excellence, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 113 (1988); Ratliff& Calhoun, Use of
Last Resort Housing Benefits and Redevelopment Powers to Preserve a Low-Income Community
Threatened with Displacement: A Case History, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 442 (1988); Sparer,
Gordion Knots: The Situation of Health Care Advocacy for the Poor Today, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 1, 22-23 (1981); Fox, Some Rules for Community Lawyers, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1
(1980). Cf. JOINT REPORT OF COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, COMMUNITY ACTION FOR
LEGAL SERVICES, NEWV YORK LAWYERS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, STEMMING THE TIDE
OF DISPLACEMENT: HOUSING POLICIES FOR PREVENTING HOMELESSNESS (1986) (policy pro-
posals couched in traditional poverty law framework).
4. See National Center on Women and Family Law, Challenges Facing Legal Services in
the 1990s. Perspectives of Women and Family Law Advocates, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 457
(1988); National Legal Aid and Defender Association and Project Advisory Group, Future
Challenges. A Planning Document for Legal Services, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 628 (1988);
Dooley & Houseman, Legal Services in the 80's and Challenges Facing the Poor, 15 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 704 (1982); A Discussion of Key Questions Facing Legal Services Programs, 15
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 2 (Special Issue, July 1981); Krakow, Bleeding the Poor Again, 14
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1031 (1981).
5. See M. VALZER, RADICAL PRINCIPLES: REFLECTIONS OF AN UNRECONSTRUCTED
DEMOCRAT 175-85 (1980) (commenting on movement from political to community organiz-
ing); Katz, Lawyers for the Poor in Transition: Invohement, Reform, and the Turnover Problem
in the Legal Services Program, 12 L. & Soc'Y REV. 275 (1978) (studying incidence of lawyer
attrition in poverty law programs).
6. For a comparative analysis of crisis theory from literary and sociological perspectives,
see T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 194-96, 214 (1983); J. HABERMAS,
LEGITIMATION CRISIS 1 (1975).
7. See R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THE-
ORY 7 (1976) (proposing recasting of social theory in response to societal crisis).
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individual transcendence nor collective solidarity.'
By rethinking, therefore, I mean an ideological inquiry regarding the
8. By social theory, I mean an alternative method of interpreting societal roles and identi-
ties pushing beyond logical and causal explanation and seeking deeper structures of meaning
and unity in the shared human experiences of everyday life. See R. UNGER, supra note 7, at 19.
See also Gordon, Review Essays: An Exchange on Critical Legal Studies between Robert W
Gordon and William Nelson, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 169-86 (1988) (defending historical work of
Critical Legal Studies scholars). Unger finds this alternative in the method of common meaning
or of interpretive explanation where he discovers semantic wholeness. R. UNGER, supra note 7,
at 246-62.
The possibility of semantic unity or wholeness, experienced as truth, is central to the arts.
In his poem To Elsie, William Carlos Williams writes:
The pure products of America
go crazy-
mountain folk from Kentucky
or the ribbed north end of
Jersey
with its isolate lakes and
valleys, its deaf-mutes, thieves
old names
and promiscuity...
will throw up a girl so desolate
so hemmed round
with disease and murder
that she'll be rescued by an
agent-
reared by the state and
sent out at fifteen to work in
some hard-pressed
house in the suburbs-
some doctor's family, some Elsie-
voluptuous water
expressing with broken
brain the truth about us-
and we degraded prisoners
destined
to hunger until we eat filth
while the imagination strains
after deer
going by fields of goldenrod in
the stifling heat of September
Somehow
it seems to destroy us





and adjust, no one to drive the car
W.C. WILLIAMS, SELECTED POEMS 54-55 (C. Tomlinson ed. 1985).
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political object of poverty law and the strategic methods of achieving that
goal. Ideological inquiry seeks to reveal the particular assumptions, expecta-
tions, and values concealed in dominant habits of perception and interpreta-
tion. Once these value-laden underpinnings are exposed, ideological inquiry
seeks to ascertain the relation between dominant habits of mind and the main-
tenance and reproduction of dominant political and socio-economic power.9
At each stage of the inquiry, focus is placed on the nature of particular beliefs
- covert and overt, conscious and unconscious - and their relation to partic-
ular formations of power.
The first purpose of this Article is to pursue an ideological inquiry with
respect to the habits of perception and interpretation dominant in the practice
of poverty law. As I hope to show, these habits reify and reproduce myths of
legal efficacy, and inherent indigent isolation and passivity which sustain and
reinforce relations of power oppressive to the poor. To explode those myths, I
shall critique the dominant traditions of poverty law: direct service 10 and law
In contrast, Wallace Stevens appears more skeptical of unity outside the world of the
imagined self. In the Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour, Stevens writes:
Light the first light of evening, as in a room
In which we rest and, for small reason, think
The world imagined is the ultimate good.
This is, therefore, the intensest rendezvous.
It is in that thought that we collect ourselves,
Out of all the indifferences, into one thing:
Within a single thing, a single shawl
Wrapped tightly round us, since we are poor, a warmth,
A light, a power, a miraculous influence.
Here, now, we forget each other and ourselves.
We feel the obscurity of an order, a whole,
A knowledge, that which arranged the rendezvous,
Within its vital boundary, in the mind.
We say God and the imagination are one...
How high that highest candle lights the dark.
Out of this same light, out of the central mind,
We make a dwelling in the evening air,
In which being there together is enough.
W. STEVENS, THE PALM AT THE END OF THE MIND: SELECTED POEMS AND A PLAY 367-68
(H. Stevens ed. 1972).
9. See T. EAGLETON, supra note 6, at 15, 197-212. Eagleton defines ideological habits to
include "modes of feeling, valuing, perceiving and believing." Id. at 15.
10. By direct service litigation, I mean litigation focused solely on individual client repre-
sentation in either administrative or judicial proceedings. Of necessity, this focus concentrates
on the particular problem of the individual client and dictates an approach tailored to specific
resolution. See Failinger & May, Litigating Against Povert: Legal Services and Group Repre-
sentation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6-18 (1984) (identifying direct service litigation as the case selec-
tion strategy favored by proponents of the equal access model). This individualized problem-
solving approach was articulated by Thomas Ehrlich, a former president of the National Legal
Services Corporation (NLSC), in testimony before a subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations in 1978. Commenting on the NLSC's "three-year plan to provide minimum
access to civil legal assistance for all poor people in the United States," Ehrlich stated:
The Corporation was established to ensure that those who are otherwise unable to
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reform"1 litigation. My thesis is that poverty cannot - indeed should not -
be remedied by these traditions. Remedial litigation 12 should not be mounted,
even where altruistic 13 relief is possible, without the activization of class con-
sciousness among the poor, nor without the political organization and mobili-
zation of the poor.
Implicit in this thesis is the view that the poor are historical actors wag-
ing a day-to-day class struggle to assert control over their lives and communi-
afford legal assistance are provided both access to justice and equal justice under the
law. Legal services lawyers act as civil law enforcement officers to ensure that the
laws are carried out on behalf of poor people. The mandate of the Corporation... is
to support "high quality legal assistance to those who would be otherwise unable to
afford adequate legal counsel."... After reviewing many alternatives, the corporation
developed the "minimum access plan" - an approach to provide a basic level of
[legal] resources to all poor communities... to provide resources that would support
the equivalent of at least two lawyers per ten thousand poor people.
Ehrlich, Giving Low-Income Americans Minimum Access to Legal Services, 64 A.B.A.J. 696,
696-97 (1978).
11. By law reform litigation, I mean litigation fashioned broadly to modify institutional
policies and practices or to revise common law, statutory, and regulatory rules. See Failinger &
May, supra note 10, at 6-18 (describing group impact litigation as the case selection strategy
favored by defenders of the law reform model). This larger systemic focus was espoused by E.
Clinton Bamberger, Jr., the first National Director of the Legal Services Program, in remarks
before the National Conference of Bar Presidents in 1966:
We cannot be content with the creation of systems of rendering free assistance to all
the people who need but cannot afford a lawyer's advice. This program must contrib-
ute to the success of the War on Poverty. Our responsibility is to marshal the forces of
law and the strength of lawyers to combat the causes and effects of poverty. Lawyers
must uncover the legal causes of poverty, remodel the systems which generate the
cycle of poverty and design new social, legal, and political tools and vehicles to move
poor people from deprivation, depression and despair to opportunity, hope and
ambition.
Bellow, Legal Aid in the United States, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 337, 340 (1980) (quoting C.
Bamberger, Address to the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Dec. 19, 1966)). See also
Bamberger, The Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity, 41 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 847, 851-52 (1966).
12. My discussion of remedial litigation is confined to the field of welfare rights. For a
broad review of social welfare reform litigation, see J. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 155-89 (1978).
These rights derive from constitutional, statutory, and regulatory sources of federal and state
law. See Sard, The Role of the Courts in Welfare Reform, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 367-88
(1988) (surveying development of welfare rights doctrine); Michelman, The Supreme Court
1968 Term Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 740-47 (1969) (considering constitutional sources of welfare protection). For an expansive
analysis of welfare rights jurisprudence, see Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare
Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985); Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare Sys-
tem, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983) [hereinafter Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class]; Handler, Discre-
tion in Social Welfare: The Uneasy Position in the Rule of Law, 92 YALE L.J. 1270 (1983).
Because I explicate welfare rights solely for the purpose of illustrating the concept of em-
powerment, my treatment of the subject is necessarily limited. In the litigation considered be-
low, I address welfare rights with reference to only a single statutory base, the cooperative
federal-state Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1786-1789 (1982).
13. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1717-22 (1976) (positing altruism as a counter-ethic reflecting solidarity).
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ties. The battle against poverty and oppressive welfare systems is their
common historical struggle. 4 By relying on direct service and law reform
litigation, poverty lawyers negate the poor as an historical class engaged in
political struggle, thereby decontextualizing,' 5 atomizing, and depoliticizing
that struggle. Moreover, by reifying the dissociated1 6 category of ingrained
indigent isolation and passivity, poverty lawyers reproduce isolation and pas-
sivity in the attorney/client relationship, thus inhibiting the potential for poli-
tical struggle. Because these contradictions plague the practice of poverty law,
the best hope for combating poverty lies not with lawyers, but with the poor
themselves. It follows that empowering the poor should be the political object
of poverty law.
Having established the goal of poverty law, I shall turn to my second
purpose and endeavor to demonstrate that poverty can be soundly attacked
only by applying an integrated theory of empowerment combining the ele-
ments of critical consciousness and discourse, the strategic methods of direct
service and law reform litigation, and the collective force of clients acting to-
gether in local, state, and national political alliances.) 7 To begin the hard
practice of theory, I counsel poverty lawyers to apply critical consciousness,
engage in dialogue, and redirect their efforts towards client empowerment, i.e.,
the activization of liberating class consciousness and the organization and mo-
bilization of grass roots client alliances in local, state, and national communi-
ties."8 My hope is that client and community empowerment may serve as a
strategic weapon in the continuing war against poverty.
14. See F. BLOCK, R. CLOWARD, B. EHRENREICH & F. PIvEN, THE MEAN SEASON: THE
ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE 3-43, 161-95 (1987) (on historical conflict over social wel-
fare programs).
15. For a demonstration of contextual analysis, see MacKinnon, Sexuality, Pornography,
and Method "Pleasure under Patriarchy," 99 ETHICS 314 (1989); Bender, A Lanyer's Primer
on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1988).
16. C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES
TO LOCKE 1 (1962). Dissociation falsely constructs an "abstract universality" of indigent
human nature. Cf. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE LJ.
1373, 1377 (1986) (on gender constructs).
17. For an historical overview of such alliances, see POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS, supra
note 1, at 264-361.
18. On the methods of community organization, see F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, THE POLI-
TICS OF TURMOIL: POVERTY, RACE, AND THE URBAN CRISIS 69-170 (1975); D. O'BREN,
NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATION AND INTEREST-GROUP PROCESSES (1975); R. BAILEY,
RADICALS IN URBAN POLITICS: THE ALINSKY APPROACH (1972); S. ALJNSKY, RULES FOR
RADICALS: A PRACTICAL PRIMER FOR REALISTIC RADICALS (1971); S. KAHN, How PEOPLE
GET POWER: ORGANIZING OPPRESSED COMMUNmES FOR ACTION (1970); S. ALINSKY,
REVEILLE FOR RADICALS (1969).
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I.
CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Empowerment demands critical consciousness.' 9 In his pioneering work
on literacy in Third World countries, the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire en-
visions critical consciousness as a learning process encompassing perception of
economic, political, and social contradictions, and engagement in remedial ac-
tion.2° Consistent with this process, poverty lawyers must learn to perceive
the contradictions in their traditional ways of seeing the poor and in their
standard methods of practicing law.2 ' Learning to perceive contradictions en-
ables poverty lawyers to transform their imagination and acquire a new vision
of the poor and legal practice. 2
The threshold of critical perception is seeing the poor not as a mytholo-
gized amalgam of isolate, passive individuals, but as an historical class en-
gaged in a daily active process of making and remaking human relationships.23
The British historian E.P. Thompson posits the notion of class as an "histori-
cal phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected
events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness." 4 For
Thompson, the notion of class entails an "historical relationship" embodied in
individuals acting in the context of daily life. 5 In this historical sense, "class
happens" when the common experiences of individuals forge an articulated
identity of common interests counterposed against different and usually op-
posing interests.2 6
19. See P. FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 19 (1968).
On the sensibility of subversion and transcendence, see H. MARCUSE, AN ESSAY ON Lin-
ERATION 23-91 (1969); H. MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 219-57 (1964).
Unger contends consciousness cannot be "grasped by a strictly sequential, necessary, and
objective knowledge." R. UNGER, supra note 7, at 41. Instead, he argues "[c]onsciousness
requires distance, the capacity to imagine oneself outside a circumstance and to wonder how
one ought to deal with it." Id. at 172.
20. P. FREIRE, supra note 19, at 19 n. 1. For an elaboration of Freire's theories of dialogue,
empowerment, and critical pedagogy, see P. FREIRE & D. MACEDO, LITERACY: READING THE
WORD AND THE WORLD (1987); P. FREIRE, PEDAGOGY IN PROGRESS: THE LETTERS TO
GUINEA-BISSAN (1978).
21. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 4, 111-35 (2d ed. 1970).
Kuhn's analysis of the nature of scientific revolutions, particularly his emphasis on perceptual
categories, anomalies, and shifts in vision, is helpful in understanding the potential transforma-
tion of the legal imagination. The twin failure of direct service and law reform litigation to
alleviate poverty or empower the poor suggests the traditional paradigm of poverty law is
askew. Id. at 121. See also J. BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 1-34 (1972) (cultural distortion repre-
sented in artistic images); J. Rns, How THE OTHER HALF LIVES: STUDIES AMONG THE TEN-
EMENTS OF NEW YORK (1971) (photographic histories of the poor); Howell, Jenny Holzer: The
Message Is The Medium, ART NEWS 122-27 (Summer 1988) (on language art); Gill, Sue Coe's
Inferno, ART NEWS 110-15 (Oct. 1987) (on political imagery).
22. To Unger, this transformation calls on the deepest levels of consciousness addressing
the perception of facts and the choice of values. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 109
(1975).
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Like Thompson's English working class, the American poor are an his-
torical phenomenon of disparate and seemingly unconnected elements unified
by the experience and consciousness of besieged survival in an advanced in-
dustrial society. But, for the American poor, the raw material of experience
and consciousness is no longer shaped primarily by historical relation to the
forces of industry, but by relation to the welfare state 7 and by poverty itself
embodied in individuals in common communities. This historical relationship
is the starting point of critical consciousness.2"
Consciousness of the historical relationship between poverty, the state,
and society as a whole cannot be bestowed willy-nilly on the poor.29 The poor
must feel and articulate the identity of their own interests. Class conscious-
ness is the way experiences are translated into cultural terms and thereby "em-
bodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms."3 0 The
operative logic in Thompson's notion of class consciousness is discernible in
the responses of similar groups undergoing similar experiences. This logic is
reflected "in different times and places, but never in just the same way." 3'
The poor in America share the common experiences of state sanctioned
poverty. In the main, these experiences are characterized by governmental
regulation3 2 and surveillance.33 The concept of surveillance put forward by
the French social theorist Michel Foucault is strikingly applicable to welfare
systems.34 As Foucault explains:
[T]he system of surveillance... involves very little expense. There is
no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a
gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its
weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own over-
seer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and
against, himself. A superb formula: power exercised continuously
and for what turns out to be a minimal cost.3 5
The exercise of power in the forms of coercion and domination applied
27. In this sense, the class relationship has assumed the "anonymous, unpolitical form" of
welfare rather than wage dependency. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 6. at 26. See also L
Friedman, Legal Culture and the Welfare State, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE
STATE 13-27 (G. Teubner ed. 1986) (on relation between legal culture and the state).
28. See G. LUKACS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIA-
LECTICS 223-55 (1971) (on historical materialism).
29. Id. at 50-82. See also M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTER-
VIEWS & OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 1-36, 62 (1980) (on popular justice and anti-judicial
struggle).
30. E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 23, at 10. See also G. LuKAcs, supra note 28, at 46-82.
31. E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 23, at 10 (emphasis in original).
32. REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 1, at 3-42, 183-99, 222-348 (disclosing forms of
social regulation).
33. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 29, at 155, 166-82.
34. See, eg., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating Alabama AFDC "substitute
father" regulation). See generally Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class supra note 12, at 1204-13.
35. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 29, at 155.
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through welfare regulation and surveillance is well recognized.36 Deploying
an analysis drawn from Foucault's critique, the German sociologist Jiirgen
Habermas asserts that the translation of power into forms of social welfare
regulation is not secured through passive, propertyless means. 37 Like Fou-
cault, he views the medium of translation to be connected with a praxis char-
acterized by the isolation of facts, the normalization of judgment, and
surveillance."8 The active components of this regulating praxis deform the
welfare client-recipient while shifting social conflict from the external material
world to the internal psychic world.3 9
Foucault extends this view, claiming the "discourse and techniques of
right" central to the protection of the poor ensnared in welfare systems to be
themselves an instrument of domination.n° Foucault contends that "right (not
simply the laws but the whole complex of apparatuses, institutions and regula-
tions responsible for their application) transmits and puts in motion relations
... of domination." 4 1
36. For enhanced detail, see REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 1, at 248-338; M. Fou-
CAULT, supra note 29, at 78-133. See also B. MANDELL, WELFARE IN AMERICA: CONTROL-
LING THE "DANGEROUS CLASSES" (1975); S. SHEEHAN, A WELFARE MOTHER (1975).
37. J. HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 362 (1987).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 29, at 95-96.
41. Id. at 95-96. For theoretical development, see Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances
and Problems in Recent Applications of the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 11 (1985); Stone, The Place of Law in the Marxian Structure-Superstructure
Archetype, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 39 (1985); Spitzer, The Dialectics of Formal and Informal
Control, Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control Problems ofAmerican Capital-
ism: A Perspective, Santos, Law and Community: The Changing Nature of State Power in Late
Capitalism, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 167-205,
207-48, 249-66 (R. Abel ed. 1982).
Legal scholarship is in upheaval over the metamorphosis of Foucault's thesis into a full
blown critique of rights. See Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1382-1403
(1984); Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1417 (1984); Hutchinson & Monahan, The
"Rights" Stuff. Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEX L. REV. 1477, 1482-91 (1984); Chase, The
Left on Rights: An Introduction, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1553-61 (1984); Gabel, The Phenome.
nology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563,
1569-99 (1984).
See also Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Per-
spectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157 (1982); Freeman, Legiti-
mizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
For sympathetic extensions, compare Binder, Commentary: On Critical Legal Studies As
Guerrilla Warfare, 76 GEO. L.J. 1 (1987); Rosenblatt, Legal Entitlement and Welfare Benefits,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 262-70 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
That critique has spawned a storm of protest from feminist, minority, and activist scholars.
See Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights,
24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989); Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transfor-
mation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Delgado,
The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorites Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repara-
tions, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987); Dalton, The
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
A THEORY OF DIALOGIC EMPOWERMENT
Foucault's contention poses an intractable dilemma to poverty lawyers
engaged in the process of welfare rights advocacy. As Habermas shows, rights
advocacy within the structures of welfare state regulation constitutes the
"legal means for securing freedom" for the poor.42 Yet, at the same time, the
structures of welfare state regulation "endanger the freedom" of the poor.43
Endangerment flows from power. To Foucault, the power of a dominant
class is exercised as a perpetual strategy manifested in a network of relations
constantly in tension, in activity, in battle with the powerless." This network
of relations descends into the "depths" of society in localized episodes of class
confrontation, instability, confict, and struggle.45 Power thus invests and ex-
erts pressure on subordinate classes, and simultaneously is transmitted and
resisted by them.' In this manner, the arrangements and internal mecha-
nisms of power "produce the relation in which individuals are caught up."247
The attorney/client and welfare system-recipient relations are arrange-
ments established by a knowledge and technology of power. These mecha-
nisms of power frame the everyday lives of clients and recipients, molding
their behavior, identity, and activity.48 The control and transformation of be-
havior stems not only from the development of a knowledge of the client-
recipient, but also from policies of coercion and discipline.4 9 Foucault claims
knowledge, particularly detailed knowledge, brings forth a "political aware-
ness" of techniques and methods of control."0 Knowledge, for example, of the
Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (1987); Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively.
The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAw & INEQUALITY 103
(1987); Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the JMomen's Move-
ment, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (1986); Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal EntitlementsM
and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN.
L. REv. 509 (1984); Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1417, 1423-41 (1984).
42. J. HABERMAS, supra note 37, at 291.
43. Id.
44. M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 26 (1979).
45. Id. at 27.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 202.
48. Id. at 77.
49. Id. at 125, 138-69. Welfare system policies of coercion and discipline are exhibited in
the political procedures of recipient registration, administrative documentation, and eligibility
assessment and punishment. See, eg., Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class, supra note 12, at 1204-
13 (on quality control documentation requirements); 20 C.F.R. § 246.7 (1988) (on WIC partici-
pant eligibility, certification, and processing criteria). These procedures objectify the recipient
exposing her to ongoing inspection. Thus, Foucault's phrase the "'anatomy' of power." M.
FOUCAULT, supra note 44, at 215-30.
50. Id. at 141. See also Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics" Confronting Scarcity
and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. REv. 337, 341 (1978). Bellow and Kettleson
assert that public interest lawyers possess "the capacity (and sometimes the motivation) to exer-
cise considerable influence over their client's choices and objectives." Id. at 341 (footnote omit-
ted). Indeed, they suggest public interest lawyers sometimes make conscious choices to exercise
such influence, and in many instances "virtually control a client's choices and are quite unaware
that they are doing so." Id at 341 n.22. No explanation accompanies their observation of the
frequent gap between "what lawyers (not just public interest lawyers) believe they do and what
they actually do [." Id
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urgent economic circumstances befalling an individual client-recipient, includ-
ing detailed information regarding her family and household responsibilities,
is a powerful form of political awareness subject to manipulation directed at
controlling client-recipient choice.
Exercising control over client-recipient choice need not be conscious or
direct. In the attorney/client relation, control is a function of hierarchy and
hence is exercised as a kind of disciplinary power .5' Disciplinary coercion is
effected by the normalizing judgment of the attorney.5 2
Normalizing judgment constrains the ambit of client choice by marking
the boundaries of permitted and forbidden action. 3 It is a "value giving"
judgment establishing both the power and penalty of the norm.54 When the
client expresses a preference for "non-conforming" action in deviation from
the traditional norm of resolution (e.g., where the client favors trial to settle-
ment, or community-oriented litigation tactics to conventional litigation tac-
tics), she may be punished by lawyer coercion, override, or withdrawal." The
power of normalizing judgment lies in its ability to compose a false reality and
ritual of client choice and decisionmaking 6
Seeing the poor as a class, perceiving class as an active human relation-
ship involving everyday experience in society, and understanding class con-
sciousness in cultural terms of domination and liberation are together the
essence of critical consciousness. Applying these insights to an analysis of the
51. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 44, at 176. See also Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Pro-
cedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 30, 116-17 (arguing that professional
ideology, representing the lawyer as the embodiment of a neutral specialized discipline, gives
rise to power over the relatively powerless and unsophisticated client).
52. Id. at 177. Cf. J. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COM-
MUNITY, BUREAUCRACY 263-92 (1986) (on the capacity for individual autonomy and self-de-
termination in the modem social welfare state).
53. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 44, at 183.
54. Id. at 183-84. By norm, I mean a standard measure or method of resolving a legal
dispute. Although objective and neutral in appearance, the applied norm may tend to legitimize
the client's victimization experienced in the forms of class, race, or gender subordination.
MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 STAN. L. REV. 703, 716 (1982).
55. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 44, at 179. Relying on poverty population studies, Abel
claims poor clients "quickly fall prey to professional dominance." Abel, Law Without Politics:
Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV. 474, 521 (1987). The studies show
"less than half the clients served knew what they wanted from the lawyer[.]" Id. at 521. Addi-
tionally, "many clients wanted the lawyer to take charge and make decisions for them." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
56. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 44, at 194. Normalizing judgment acts to silence the poor.
On gender silencing, see Jones, On Authority: Or, Why Women Are Not Entitled to Speak, in
FEMINISM & FOUCAULT 119-33 (I. Diamond & L. Quinby eds. 1988); C. GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Ritual-
istic decisionmaking enlists the client in a mechanism of oppressive power, in a practice of
subordination, thus limiting the client in who she can be. See Williams, Deconstructing Gender,
87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 845 (1989); MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 714. Rather than resisting
and releasing the limits of clients' lives, normalizing judgment works to fortify those limits. Id.
at 736. See Scheingold, The Dilemma of Legal Services, 36 STAN. L. REV. 879, 888-89 (1984)
("[W]hile Legal Services has succeeded in ameliorating the conditions of poverty, it has at the
same time helped to legitimate the poor's second-class status.").
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social role of the individual poor (e.g., as transcendent and transformative his-
torical actor or as isolate and passive client-recipient) and the social organiza-
tion of poor communities (e.g., as active and unified or reactive and
fragmented) is critical consciousness at work. 7
Guided by critical consciousness, the poor may embrace what the histori-
ans Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward term the "solidarities of every-
day life.""8 In so doing, the poor may "live their own history"S9 and make
class happen. To that end, poverty lawyers must construct a new paradigm
and vision of practice.6"
The initial step in the transformation of the poverty lawyer's imagination
towards critical consciousness is the shattering of tradition-bound myths.6" A
cluster of two myths comprise the poverty lawyer's core constellation of be-
liefs. Most basic is the deeply embedded belief that the law - in its constitu-
tional, statutory, and decisional forms - and legal institutions - courts,
governmental agencies, and advocacy organizations - can be marshaled into
an effective instrument to alleviate poverty.
This bedrock premise, what I shall call legal efficacy, animates and in-
forms the work of poverty lawyers. History teaches that this premise is over-
broad. The work of Roberto Unger62 and Morton Horwitz63 reveals a
pronounced indeterminacy" in the interplay of formalism65 and instrumental-
57. E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 23, at 11. To be accurate, that analysis must draw upon
observations of the poor in the daily patterns marking their relationships, ideas, and institu-
tions. Id.
58. F. PIVEN & 1. CLOWARD, THE NEw CLASS WAR: REAGAN'S ATTACK ON THE
WELFARE STATE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 51 (1982).
59- E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 23, at 11.
60. On the reconstruction of practice paradigms in science and law, compare T. KUHN,
supra note 21, at 111-35 and G. HOLTON, THEMATIC ORIGINS OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT:
KEPLER TO EINSTEIN 219-59 (1973) and J. BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES 3-20
(1965) with Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, And Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
1, 47-50 (1984-85)(advocating demystification of the legal process and organization of groups
through community social struggle) and Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN.
L. REv. 469 (1984) (setting forth a critical vision of nonhierarchical law practice) and Gabel &
Harris, Building Power and Breaking Image." Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 1
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-83) (putting forward principles of counter hege-
monic law practice).
61. I. ILLICH, TooLs FOR CONVIVIALrrY 110-11 (1973) (discussing interpretive
frameworks). Leslie Bender describes this necessary step as "frame-bursting" in the similar
context of feminist methodology and consciousness raising. See Bender, supra note 15, at 9.
62. See R. UNGER, supra note 7, at 193-216; &. UNGER, supra note 22, at 88-100.
63. See M. HoRWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977) (on
formalism and instrumentalism in private law development).
64. On doctrinal indeterminacy, see M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUD-
IES 15-63, 186-268 (1987); Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phe-
nomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986). Compare Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF.
L. REV. 283, 302-37 (1989)(rejecting critical legal scholars' arguments for radical indetermi-
nacy and counterposing claim for moderate indeterminacy); Matsuda, supra note 41, at 341
("The minority experience of dual consciousness accommodates both the idea of legal indeter-
minacy as well as the core belief in a liberating law that transcends indeterminacy.").
65. Formalism describes a particular style of legal reasoning operating "when the mere
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ism 66 in legal doctrine. Even apart from class relations of domination and
subordination, doctrinal indeterminacy warrants skepticism concerning the ef-
ficacy of law-induced programmatic change.67
The prevalence of a justifiable skepticism concerning the efficacy of law as
an instrument of altruistic social change does not warrant a turn towards ni-
hilism. 68 Skepticism notwithstanding, there exists in the law a transcendent
spirit,69 internal logic, 70 and autonomy7 which may spark and effect altruistic
invocation of rules and the deduction of conclusions from them is believed sufficient for every
authoritative legal choice." R. UNGER, supra note 7, at 194. For an elucidation and defense of
formalism as an approach to legal understanding and as a concept of decisionmaking, see
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988);
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
66. Instrumentalism is a purposive or policy-oriented style of legal reasoning functioning
"when the decision about how to apply a rule depends on a judgment of how most effectively to
achieve the purposes ascribed to the rule." Id. at 194. On the general theory and history of
pragmatic instrumentalism, see R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL
THEORY (1982); Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism In Twentieth Century American Legal
Thought - A Synthesis And Critique Of Our Dominant General Theory About Law And Its Use,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1981).
67. While critical, many scholars remain steadfast in their defense of law-erected protec-
tions and in their encouragement of law-induced programmatic change. See S. Ellmann, From
Nkwentsha to United Democratic Front: The State of Emergency and the Practice of Law in
South Africa Today 158-90 (1989) (unpublished manuscript); Kennedy, Martin Luther King's
Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1054-67
(1989); White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988
Wis. L. REV. 699, 745-69; Crenshaw, supra note 41, at 1369-87; Taylor, Brown, Equal Protec-
tion, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700, 1725-35 (1986); Bell, Law, Litigation, and
the Search for the Promised Land (Book Review), 76 GEO. L.J. 229, 233-36 (1987); Bell, The
Supreme Court 1984 Term Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985);
Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR.
L. REV. 201, 235-44 (1982).
68. For an exposition and critique of legal nihilism, compare Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984) with Stick, Can Nihilism Be Prag-
matic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986).
69. On the symbolic value of rights, see Schall, Human Rights As An Ideological Project,
1987 AM. J. JURIS. 47; Gorecki, Human Rights: Explaining the Power of A Moral and Legal
Idea, 1987 AM. J. JURIS. 153; S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974).
70. On the internal logic and progress of normative values embedded in civil rights law,
see E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 258-69 (1975);
M. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-
50 (1987); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); C.V. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974).
71. On the relative autonomy of law from class-state power structures, see E.P. THOMP-
SON, supra note 70, at 258-69; M. HORWITZ, supra note 63, at xiii; Kennedy, Toward an Histor-
ical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America
1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc. 4 (1980); Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on
the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 571 (1977).
See also M. FOUCAULT, supra note 44, at 82 (on the "space of tolerance" afforded by law
and custom); R. UNGER,, supra note 7, at 52-56 (on the interdependent autonomy of legal
order). Compare Abel, supra note 55, at 593 ("[W]e must not assume that because some can
invoke law as a shield against state power others can wield it as a sword to alter fundamental
class relations. The assumption is false not only because of the essential difference between
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. XVI:659
A THEORY OF DIALOGIC EMPOWERMIENT
change. Yet, even where altruism prevails and the legal rights of the poor
expand, their growth is halting and slow. 72
The second myth7" pervading the work of poverty lawyers is the belief in
the inherent isolation and passivity of the poor-the inability of the poor to
interconnect and exercise shared control over their own lives and communi-
ties.7' Freire attributes partial transmission of this myth to the prejudices and
deformations of those who "move to the side of the exploited," 75 in this con-
text poverty lawyers. These prejudices and deformations are expressed in a
"lack of confidence in the people's ability to think, to want, and to know." 76
Like the mythology of social Darwinism infecting late nineteenth and
early twentieth century American thought,7" the myth of ingrained indigent
isolation and passivity is grounded in a woeful mix of cultural and scientific
theory - the culture of poverty.78 Founded on the work of the anthropologist
resisting state power and seeking to mobilize it... but also because the form of bourgeois law is
not equally appropriate to protect all interests.").
72. On remedial implementation, see P. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS (1988); Bensinger, From Public
Charity to Social Justice: The Role of the Court in California's General Relief Program, 21 LoY.
L.A.L. REv. 497 (1988); McKittrick, The Homeless" Judicial Intervention On Behalf Of A Po-
litically Powerless Group, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.L 389 (1988); Chackes, Sheltering the Homeless"
Judicial Enforcement of Governmental Duties to the Poor, 31 WASH. UJ. URD. & COrTrEiP. L
155 (1987); J. PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION (1971); Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudi-
cation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1970).
Some commentators argue legal institutions are structurally ill-suited to adjudicate and
implement the legal rights of the poor. See Hanson, Contending Perspectives on Federal Court
Efforts to Reform State Institutions, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 289 (1988); D. HOROWITZ, THE
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292-1316 (1976).
73. P. FREIRE, supra note 19, at 40. Describing the two stages of critical pedagogy, Freire
asserts the need for confrontation with the "culture of domination" in order to "unveil the
world of oppression." Id. In the first stage of pedagogy, confrontation occurs through a change
in perception. Id. In the second stage, confrontation occurs through the "expulsion" or domi-
nating myths. Id.
74. Id. at 46-54. See also J. KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 40 (1982)
(tracing the historical antecedents of the poverty law conception of the "pathological poor").
For a discussion of voluntary and nonvoluntary communities, see Friedman, Feminism and
Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community, 99 ETHICS 275, 277-90 (1989).
75. P. FREIRE, supra note 19, at 46.
76. Id. Freire declares:
Our converts, on the other hand, truly desire to transform the unjust order, but be-
cause of their background, they believe that they must be the executors ofthe transfor-
mation. They talk about the people, but they do not trust them; and trusting the
people is the indispensable precondition for revolutionary change.
Id.
77. On the historical evolution of social Darwinism in American business, culture, and
society, see C. RussErr, DARWIN IN AMERICA: THE INTELLECTUAL RESPONSE 1865-1912
83-123 (1976); R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 6, 13-122, 143-
204 (1944).
78. Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 187 (D. Moynihan
ed. 1968). For a forceful rebuttal assailing cultural theories of isolation and marginality, see
Karst, Citizenship, Race, And Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 8-24 (1988); W. WIL-
SON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POL-
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Oscar Lewis, the culture of poverty thesis claims the "major characteristics"
of the individual poor to be "strong feelings of marginality, of helplessness, of
dependence, and of inferiority."'7 9
Although poverty lawyers may not endorse the culture of poverty thesis,
they are enmeshed in a social system - the attorney/client relation - con-
signing the poor to the status of dependent other.8" Consignment subordinates
the poor through a process of eliciting and verifying client dependence. 8 Ob-
jectively manifested as docility, passivity, and malleability, client dependence
nevertheless is a social construct reified by attorney/client hierarchy.
Reification - the process of transforming subjective form into "phantom
objectivity""2 - of the myth of inherent indigent isolation and passivity stems
from decontextualization of the poor from domination-based social arrange-
ments and relations. Decontextualization follows from the negation of the
poor as a social class engaged in historical struggle. Poverty lawyers do not
confess to this historical negation, though it directs their engineering of law
and legal institutions on behalf of the poor. In this way, negation reproduces
isolation and passivity in the attorney/client relationship. The reproduction
of isolation and passivity marginalizes the poor.
Marginalization is part of the demeaning process of domination. Freire
IcY (1987); Wacquant & Wilson, The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City and
Wilson, The Underclass: Issues, Perspectives, and Public Policy, in The Ghetto Underclass: So-
cial Science Perspectives, ANNALS 8-25, 182-92 (R. Lambert, A. Heston, & W. Wilson eds.)
(Jan. 1989); Glasgow, The Black Underclass in Perspective, in NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE,
INC., THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1987 129-44 (1987).
79. Lewis, supra note 78, at 191-92. Lewis adds:
Other traits include high incidence of maternal deprivation, of orality, and of weak
ego structure; confusion of sexual identification; lack of impulse control; strong pres-
ent-time orientation, with relatively little ability to defer gratification and to plan for
the future; sense of resignation and fatalism; widespread belief in male superiority; and
high tolerance for psychological pathology of all sorts.
People with a culture of poverty are provincial and locally oriented and have very
little sense of history. They know only their own troubles, their own local conditions,
their own neighborhoods, their own way of life. Usually they do not have the knowl-
edge, the vision, or the ideology to see the similarities between their problems and
those of their counterparts elsewhere in the world. They are not class conscious
although they are very sensitive indeed to status distinctions.
Id.
For an augmentation of Lewis's cultural thesis, see C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND:
AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984); J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975);
D. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING (1970); E. BANFIELD, THE UN-
HEAVENLY CITY REVISITED (1968). Compare Mattison, Stop Making Sense: Charles Murray
and the Reagan Perspective on Social Welfare Policy and the Poor, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 90,
91 (1985) (accusing Murray of employing "biased and faulty perceptions about social welfare
programs and the poor in order to reach a result predetermined by his ideological
perspective.").
80. The demeaning characterization of the poor as deviant other is observed by Kenneth
Karst, see Karst, supra note 78, at 3-4; J. HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 36-37, 43. 93.
81. On this process engendered, see Scales, supra note 16, at 1378.
82. For an exploration of reification, see G. LUKACS, supra note 28, at 83, 84-222. See also
Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1152, 1157-58, 1274-90 (1985).
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advances two concepts unraveling this process. First, he ventures the concept
of self-depreciation:
Self-depreciation is another characteristic of the oppressed, which
derives from their internalization of the opinion the oppressors hold
of them. So often do they hear that they are good for nothing, know
nothing and are incapable of learning anything - that they are sick,
lazy, and unproductive - that in the end they become convinced of
their own unfitness.8 3
The concept of self-depreciation also emerges in the historian Harry
Boyte's analysis of American grass roots citizen advocacy and organizing
movements.8 4 These movements are enlightening because they show that
while the signs of self-depreciation may vary depending upon the organizing
project constituency and terrain (e.g., age, ethnicity, gender, race, religion,
geography, and class), the experience of domination is at once common. To
Boyte, self-depreciation is the shared experience of "ordinary people, steeped
in lifelong experiences of humiliation and self-doubt, barred from acquisition
of basic public skills," an experience demeaning to "people's self-conceptions
and sense of possibility.""5
In additi6n, Freire offers the concept of adaptation, suggesting that "the
more the oppressed can be led to adapt to a situation, the more easily they can
be dominated." 6 Freire argues adaptation is encouraged by the paternalistic
operation of the welfare state in objectifying the poor as dependent
recipients.8 7
Marginalization of the poor wrought by domination and evinced by self-
depreciating passivity is frequently visible albeit misinterpreted by poverty
lawyers. More oblique is the marginalization of domination experienced by
the poor as a function of their adaptation, integration, and incorporation into
welfare programs and relationships. 8 The WIC program offers an instructive
83. P. FREIRE, supra note 19, at 49. Self-depreciation implicates Unger's sentiment of
resignation expressed as the "despairing submission to a social order whose claims are inwardly
despised." R. UNGER, supra note 22, at 26.
84. H. BOYTE, THE BACKYARD REVOLUTION: UNDERSTANDING THE NE\V CIIZEN
MOVEMENT 192-94 (1980).
85. Id. at 179, 15.
86. P. FRETRE, supra note 19, at 60.
87. Id. Freire also complains of the contributing degeneration of knowledge, resisting its
conceptualization as "a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon
those whom they consider to know nothing." Id. at 58. Deriding this concept for "[p]rojecting
an absolute ignorance onto others," Freire contends that "[k]nowledge emerges only through
invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry men
pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other." Id. Knowledge, in short, emerges
through the process of dialogue.
88. Foucault notes that the goal of integrating and incorporating marginals, particularly
the "wilfully idle" - the "bad poor" - through methods of domination has "replace[d] the
somewhat global charitable sacralization of 'the poor.'" M. FOUCAULT, supra note 29, at 169.
See also IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE, supra note 1, at ix-35.
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example.8 9
Federal enactment of the WIC program in 1972, as an amendment to the
Child Nutrition Act of 1966,90 and subsequent amendments, 91 rest on congres-
sional findings "that substantial numbers of pregnant, postpartum, and
breastfeeding women, infants, and young children from families with inade-
quate income are at special risk with respect to their physical and mental
health by reason of inadequate nutrition or health care, or both." 92 Yet, Con-
gress' declared purpose - to provide "supplemental foods and nutrition edu-
cation" - is expressly limited by the "authorization levels" set forth in
section 1786(g) of the statute, and by the voluntary "participation" proviso
governing the eligibility of local agencies. 9 Moreover, federal implementing
regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Agriculture enu-
merate seven categories of participant nutritional risk priority to be applied
systematically in order to "fill vacancies which occur after a local agency has
reached its maximum participation level." '94
Together, WIC statutory and regulatory authorization, participation, and
priority limits hinder the distribution of program benefits to the nutritionally-
at-risk poor. 95 This hindrance, borne out by the increasing feminization and
89. See supra note 12.
90. Child Nutrition Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-433, § 9, 86 Stat. 729-31
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (86 Stat.) 3380.
91. Child Nutrition Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-627, § 3, 92 Stat. 3611
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat.) 9227.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1786(a) (1982).
93. Id. In the fiscal year ending September 30, 1986, Congress appropriated
$1,570,000,000 to carry out the declared purpose of the statute. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1786(g) (West
Supp. 1988).
94. 7 C.F.R. § 246.7(d)(4)(i)-(vii) (1988). See Alexander v. Polk, 459 F. Supp. 883, 886-88
(E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part & remanded with directions, 750 F.2d 250 (3d Cir.
1984) (enforcing regulatory fair hearing right of WIC recipients terminated under the City of
Philadelphia's priority system).
95. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reports WIC "federal funding levels are
insufficient for many of the eligible women and children to participate." CENTER ON BUDGET
AND POLICY PRIORITIES, HOLES IN THE SAFETY NETS: POVERTY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES
IN THE STATES - NATIONAL OVERVIEW 33 (1988). Indeed, "[n]ationwide, fewer than half
(about 45 percent) of WIC eligibles are served under the program." Id. at 34 (citation and
footnote omitted). By early 1988, only eleven states were providing funds to supplement federal
WIC monies in order to widen service to the eligible. Id.
Habermas suggests a "withdrawal of legitimation" may follow from this type of govern-
mental lag behind "programmatic demands that it has placed on itself." J. HABERMAS, supra
note 6, at 69 (emphasis in original). A recent Ford Foundation study buttresses this point,
evidencing the deterioration of program legitimacy. See FORD FOUNDATION PROJECT ON SO-
CIAL WELFARE AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, THE COMMON GOOD: SOCIAL WELFARE AND
THE AMERICAN FUTURE 10-29, 85-88 (1989). The study confirms that
states can and often do choose to serve only a limited number of those who are [WIC]
eligible and some states are reluctant to search vigorously for needy children who
qualify for the program. Only about half of the eligible women and children are
reached by the WIC program as it is currently constituted.
Id. at 15. See also FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, FEEDING THE OTHER HALF vi
(1989).
Findings indicate states may increase WIC participation and decrease related program,
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infantilization of poverty96 and the stabilizing of infant mortality rates at
unacceptably high levels,97 marginalizes the poor even as they are integrated
and incorporated in remedial welfare programs. Domination is expressed then
not merely in unabated hunger and infant mortality, but in adaptation to these
conditions. When adaptation inhibits the imagining of alternative conditions,
domination reigns.
To subvert domination in this instance, poverty lawyers must unmask the
identity of the WIC program. For Habermas, unmasking can be accomplished
hospital, and Medicaid costs, see, e.g., UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
BRIEFING REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUTRITION AND INVESTIGA-
TIONS, COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, U.S. SENATE, SUPPLE-
MENTAL FOOD PROGRAM: SAVINGS FROM FOOD PURCHASES COULD INCREASE ,VIC
PARTICIPATION (July 1988) (reporting that state cost savings may increase the number of WIC
eligible participants served); Edelman & Weill, Investing in Our Children, 4 YALE L. & PoL'Y
REV. 331, 361 (1986) ("Every dollar we invest in the WIC program saves as much as S3 in
short-term hospital costs, and more over the long term.") (footnote omitted); Schramm, WIC
Prenatal Participation and Its Relationship to Newborn Medicaid Costs in Missourk A Cost!
Benefit Analysis, 75 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 851 (1985) (WIC expenditures associated with
reduced Medicaid costs and possible birthweight improvements).
For an evaluation of the impact of the WIC program on the nutritional status and health of
participant women and children, see generally Participants in the National WIC Evaluation,
The National WIC Evaluation: Evaluation of the Special Supplemental Food Program for Wo-
men, and Children, 48 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 389-519 (1988).
96. See supra note 2. See also Rexroat, Economic Transformation, Family Structure, and
Poverty Rates of Black Children in Metropolitan Areas, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 67, 69 (1989) (re-
porting a sizeable increase in child poverty rates for northern metropolitan areas); FOOD RE-
SEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, THE NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF LO\V-INCOME PRESCHOOL
CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 17-41 (1989) (surveying
adverse nutritional consequences of low-income status of preschool children, especially obesity
and socio-behavioral problems); Edelman & Weill, supra note 95, at 335-43 (documenting in-
creased child poverty marked by widespread hunger and malnutrition).
97. Edelman and Weill report:
Our nation's progress in reducing infant mortality has slowed down, dropping
from a 5 percent average annual rate of improvement in the 1970s to a 3 percent
average annual rate between 1981 and 1983. As the death rates among infants are
highest for the poor, this reflects, in particular, a slowdown in improvement for black
infants, who are disproportionately poor.
Edelman & Weill, supra note 95, at 338 (footnotes omitted). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1989
76 (109th ed. 1989) (documenting two percent average annual rate of infant mortality improve-
ment between 1984 and 1986).
For more recent documentation, see Stevens, Infant Diarrhea Kills Hundreds Yearly in
US., N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1988, at Al, A33, col. 1 (report of new study indicating "that deaths
from diarrhea 'constitute an important and preventable fraction' of infant mortality in
America"); Infants More at Risk in Poor RuralAreas, New Study Indicates, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8,
1988, at B25, col. 4 (report of study finding levels of infant mortality, low birth weight, and
maternal care "deteriorated from 1980 to 1982 nationwide and remained stable from 1982 to
1985"); U.S. Falling Short on Its Infant Health Goals, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1988, at A17, col. 1
(reporting" 'some significant problems relating to maternal and infant health,'" and that "[t]he
decline in the infant mortality rate has slowed"); Leary, U.S. Urged to Fight Infant Mortality,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1988, at D17, col. 1 (reporting on congressional panel's call for a "compre-
hensive policy to combat infant mortality," and findings "that, each year, 40,000 infants in the
United States die before their first birthday and that 18 other industrialized nations have lower
rates of infant mortality").
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by confronting the contradiction and incompatibility between program "idea
and reality."98 Without recognition of the asymmetry between WIC program
"claims and intentions," domination may remain latent.99 When program-
matic incompatibility is recognized, Habermas argues, conflict may become




The dominant traditions of poverty law transmit cultural mythologies
through the attorney/client relation, obfuscating perception and interpretation
of the common struggle of the poor to survive and overcome the conditions of
poverty.10' The obscurantist influence of myth is best expressed in the notion
of hegemony. 102
The Italian social theorist Antonio Gramsci advances the idea of hegem-
ony to signal dominant group continuity and tradition in active develop-
ment. 103 To'Gramsci, hegemony is a process of assimilation, education, and
adaptation consistent with the achievement of dominant group goals. 104 In
practice, hegemony ensures a "correspondence" between individual acts and
admissions, and between individual conduct and necessary group ends. 0
Gramsci concedes hegemonic correspondence may appear at times in the
coercive guise of force. He stresses, however, its noncoercive nature. 106 This
emphasis both highlights the repressive aspect of hegemony and underscores
its potential for liberation.10 7
Hegemonic liberation inheres in Gramsci's general conception of law and
extends to the specific field of poverty law. Gramsci conceives of law as an
instrument to "create and maintain a certain type of civilisation and of citizen
(and hence of collective life and of individual relations), and to eliminate cer-
tain customs and attitudes and to disseminate others . ,,108 On this view,
98. J. HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 23, 26-27.
99. Id. at 27.
100. Id.
101. Reductionism of the term individual from a broad "indivisible" concept implicating
the social group to a narrow separate notion implying an opposing disconnected sphere simi-
larly distorts interpretation of the historical struggle of the poor. See C. MACPHERSON, sulpra
note 16, at 3, 263-77.
102. E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDON, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 25 (1972).
103. A. GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 195-96, 246-47 (Q. Hoare
& G. Smith eds. 1971).
104. Id. For amplification of Gramsci's idea of hegemony, see Brosnan, Serious But Not
Critical, 60 S. CALIF. L. REV. 259, 305-08, 312-17 (1987).
105. A. GRAMSCI, supra note 103, at 195-96.
106. Id. at 196 (establishing a correspondence between hegemony, public opinion, and
moral climate).
107. Id. at 247, 246.
108. Id. at 246. Enriching this conception, Tove Stang Dahl adds:
Law is an important part of the cultural hegemony that men have in our type of
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the law is a kind of educator tending to foster a "new type or level of
civilisation."10 9
Conversely, the law may function as an instrument of rationalization le-
gitimating conditions of oppression.1 0 The key for Gramsci, and for poverty
lawyers, is to uncloak the contradictions suppressed by rationalization and to
cultivate an alternative or counter hegemony. The turmoil of hegemonic con-
flict creates the conditions in which an alternative way of life - differentiated
by liberation - is imagined possible.
The historian Eugene Genovese interprets Gramsci's idea of hegemony to
imply not only class antagonism, but also class legitimacy.' Like Gramnsci,
Genovese proclaims the hegemonic function of law as disguising class
anatagonisms in a cloak of juridical legitimacy, thus minimizing the necessity
for the use of coercion.1 12
Although Genovese considers law to be a principal vehicle of dominant
class hegemony, he properly rejects simple-minded reduction of the law to a
reflexive superstructural phenomenon, 13 contrary to the declarations of more
orthodox Marxists. 1 4 By rejecting a crudely deterministic conception, Geno-
vese grants the law a degree of autonomy in shaping class relations, albeit as
an instrument of domination.' 15 In his view, the law is not "something passive
and reflective," but "an active, partially autonomous force" mediating among
competing socio-economic classes.' 1 6
For Genovese, the legal system molds and is molded by the interrelation
society, and a cultural hegemony means that a ruling group's special way of viewing
social reality is accepted as normal and as a part of the natural order of things, even by
those who are in fact subordinated by it. In this way law contributes to maintaining
the ruling group's position.
T. DAHL, WOMEN'S LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO FEmINIST JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1987).
109. A. GRAMscI, supra note 103, at 247. It is important to note Gramsci's recognition of
the law as an autonomous force capable of spontaneous development and "haphazard and spo-
radic germination." Id.
110. Id. For an exploration of hegemony as "a way of interpreting reality" established and
perpetuated by the federal judiciary, see Walsh, "The People Who Own the Country Ought to
Govern It" The Supreme Court, Hegemony, and Its Consequences, 5 LAW & INEQUALTIY 431,
434 (1988).
111. E. GENOVESE, supra note 102, at 26.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 25.
114. For feminist and humanistic approaches to the Marxian analysis of the relation be-
tween class, law, and the state, see D. COOLE, WOMEN IN POLITICAL THEORY: FRoM AN-
CIENT MISOGYNY TO CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM 251-54 (1988); MacKinnon, Feminism.
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. VOMEN CUL-
TURE & Soc'Y 635 (1983); E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 70, at 258-69.
For a survey of recent Neo-Marxian scholarship, see Tay & Kamenka, New Marxismsfor
Old- Contemporary Radicalism and Legal Theory, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 605 (1988).
For more rigidly instrumentalist and structuralist formulations, see E. WRIGHT, CLASS,
CRISIS, AND THE STATE (1978); N. POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM (1978); R. MILl-
BAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY (1969).
115. E. GENOVESE, supra note 102, at 25.
116. Id. at 26.
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of socio-economic classes evolving in society. This molding becomes more
pronounced when a political center emerges within a class clearly perceiving
the "interests and needs of the class as a whole.""1 7 As a class becomes "more
conscious of its nature, spirit, and destiny" and reaches a "higher understand-
ing of itself" manifested in a particular world view, Genovese contends the
class is "transformed from a class-in-itself, reacting to pressures on its objec-
tive position, into a class-for-itself, consciously striving to shape the world in
its own image.""'  Once a class acting-for-itself acquires possession of public
power, Genovese suggests the juridical system may become both an expression
of class interest and a theater of class mediation." 9
Dominant legal traditions mediate class antagonisms between the poor
and competing socio-economic classes.' 2° Mediation is effectuated by the
mystifying process of legalization whereby class antagonisms are decontextu-
alized and individualized, then channeled into formal, purportedly neutral cat-
egories of sanctioned conduct, such as rights and duties. By compelling and
validating conduct in terms of apolitical norms and standards, poverty law
inhibits consciousness of class and class conflict. 121
To inculcate consciousness of class among the poor, poverty lawyers
must reshape and thereby subvert dominant hegemony. The British cultural
theorist Raymond Williams embellishes the idea of dominant hegemony, re-
casting it to capture the "wholeness" of the "lived social process" experienced
by subordinate classes. 122 He construes dominant hegemony as the practical
organization of this process around specific dominant meanings and values.
Mapping the patterns of the "whole social process" in accordance with spe-
cific distributions of power and influence, Williams explains class relations of
domination and subordination translate into forms of "practical conscious-
117. Id. at 27.
118. Id.
119. Id. Moreover, Genovese argues the legal system may become an "instrument by
which the advanced section of the ruling class imposes its viewpoint upon the class as a whole
and the wider society." Id. The imposition of hegemony through law serves to "discipline the
ruling class and to guide and educate the masses." Id. Discipline, guidance, and education are
accomplished by establishing criminal and civil standards of behavior which compel social con-
formity, sanction norms, and validate ethical conduct. Id. These standards hold hegemonic
sway and mediate class antagonisms until contradictions appear exposing the deceptions under-
girding law and society. Id. at 30. When an awareness of rights withheld springs from the
exposure of legal and societal deceptions, hegemony may be subverted and world view
remolded. Id. at 31-49.
120. For a close analysis of class mediation within the forum of the modern welfare state,
see I. GOUGH, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WELFARE STATE (1979); J. O'CONNOR, THE
FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973).
121. On the relation between class mediation and legal formalism, see Gabel, Reification in
Legal Reasoning, in MARXISM AND LAW 262-78 (P. Beime & R. Quinney eds. 1982). See also
M. Horwitz, supra note 63, at 253-66.
122. Williams defines dominant hegemony alternatively as the "complex interlocking of
political, social, and cultural forces," and as "the active social and cultural forces which are its
necessary elements." R. WILLIAMS, MARXISM AND LITERATURE 108-09 (1977) (emphasis in
original).
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ness," producing "a saturation of the whole process of living."1 2
Williams sees that process encompassing economic, political, and social
activity together with the "whole substance of lived identities and relation-
ships."'12 4 The depth of saturation is such that the "pressures and limits" gen-
erated by a specific economic, political, and cultural system appear as the
"pressures and limits of simple experience."' 25 In this way, objective relations
of domination and subordination become a whole body of subjective practices
and expectations permeating the "whole of living," suffusing individual
"senses and assignments of energy," and shaping perceptions of self and the
world. 126
The transmutation of domination into a lived system of subjective mean-
ings and values - a system experienced as a set of "reciprocally confirming"
natural practices - is the insidious work of hegemony.'" Insidious because
that lived system creates a sense of reality verging on the absolute in excluding
and selecting out alternative versions of reality. For Williams, this confined
sense of reality is a culture consisting of the "lived dominance and subordina-
tion of particular classes. "2'
Williams rightly notes that the experience of domination is not passive
and one-dimensional, but rather an active, complex process. The process is
mutable and textured because it gathers from a web of "experiences, relation-
ships, and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits." 29
Hence, it is a process "continually... renewed, recreated, defended, and mod-
ified.""' At the same time, it is a process "continually resisted, limited, al-
tered, [and] challenged by pressures not at all its own." 13 1 These pressures are
applied by ordinary people acting singly and in relationships to decipher and
remake material reality.
Deciphering and remaking reality constitutes the work of alternative or
counter hegemony. Williams introduces these concepts to describe "forms of
alternative or directly oppositional politics and culture." ' He suggests the
existence of significant oppositional forces precludes the total and exclusive
hold of dominant hegemony over society.13 3
Williams's cultural analysis is instructive for poverty lawyers in disclos-
ing the integral relation between tradition and domination. Indeed, it is the
meanings and values of poverty law traditions which reciprocally confirm
123. Id. at 109-10. See generally R. WILLIAMS, RESOURCES OF HOPE (L Gable ed. 1989);
R. WILLIAMS, CULTURE & SOCIETY: 1780-1950 (1983).





129. Id. at 112.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 113.
133. Id.
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domination of the poor. Confirmation of this bleak condition diminishes the
breadth of attorney/client vision. As vision contracts, the belief in alternative
constructs and practices is relegated to delusion.134
Counter hegemony enables the poor to reclaim the belief in an alternative
vision of reality. Reclamation must begin with the poor investigating hege-
monic alternatives to their socially constructed and reified client-recipient
identity. In accord with feminist methodology, this role investigation centers
on communication in collective relational contexts by means of consciousness
raising. 135
By developing hegemonic alternatives and oppositional discourses 136 in
collective relational contexts, the poor enter the transformational process of
breaking free from the subordinate role and identity assigned by the dominant
hegemony. 137 With the splintering of dominant hegemony, the poor may con-
verge as a class-for-itself around an alternative vision of reality.
This convergence is congruent with E.P. Thompson's notion of class as a
"self-defining historical formation" constructed from the human experience of
struggle.' 38 Thompson's understanding of men and women as historical
"makers" of social class 139 and class consciousness' 40 reinforces the impor-
tance of grounding empowerment in the concrete historical conditions of poor
communities. The object of empowerment is to raise consciousness of class
among disparate individuals and groups living in those communities.
A. Dominant Traditions
To elucidate the idea of hegemony as an active process of cultural incor-
poration interweaving various meanings, values, and practices, Williams sets
forth the concept of tradition.14 ' Departing from the strictures of antiquated
Marxist cultural theory, Williams reasserts tradition as an "actively shaping
force" expressing "dominant and hegemonic pressures and limits.' 14  As a
means of incorporation, this expression is necessarily "selective," representing
an intentionally discriminatory version of a "shaping past and a pre-shaped
present."' 4 3 Emerging dominant, the selective version directs the "process of
134. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 96 (remarking on the interconnection between an
"individual's perception of his own powerlessness and the lack of alternatives open to him").
135. Scales, supra note 16, at 1386, 1401-02. Scales considers consciousness raising "an
inherently transformative process" validating experience and expressing self-creation and re-
sponsibility. Id. at 1401-02.
136. This term is taken from Nancy Fraser. See Fraser, Talking about Needs: Interpretive
Contests as Political Conflicts in Welfare-State Societies, 99 ETHIcS 291, 303 (1989).
137. R. WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 115.
138. E.P. THOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 46 (1978).
139. Id. (rejecting reduction of social class to a "static category").
140. E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 23, at 11 ("Class is defined by men as they live their own
history, and, in the end, this is its only definition.").
141. R. WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 115.
142. Id.
143. Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. XVI:659
A THEORY OF DIALOGIC EMPOWERMENT
social and cultural definition and identification." 1"4
Two traditions dominate the practice of poverty law. The first tradition
is denominated by direct service litigation. The second tradition is designated
by law reform litigation. Both traditions deliberately select specific meanings
and practices in fashioning dominant conventions, language, and institutional
structures.
L Direct Service
Since the late nineteenth century, the direct service tradition of providing
civil legal assistance to the poor has predominated. 145 Initially staffed by vol-
unteer lawyers or operated by private legal aid societies supported by charita-
ble contributions and local governmental funding, 46 organizations tied to the
direct service tradition prevailed for nearly five decades 47
In the early 1960s, more innovative poverty law programs emerged exem-
plified by Mobilization for Youth (MFY) in New York City and Community
Progress Incorporated in New Haven, Connecticut.14 8 Funded by federal,
state, and local monies, and supplemented by foundation grants, 49 these dem-
onstration projects presaged later programs developed by the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity 50 (OEO), culminating in the National Legal Services
Program"' (NLSP) and ultimately in the National Legal Services Corpora-
tion (NLSC).1 52
The direct service tradition is marred by dominant tendencies prescribing
the routine treatment of poor clients as isolated and passive individuals with-
144. Id.
145. For historical background, see J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 53-62, 263-308 (1976); 1. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE
POOR 133-99 (2d ed. 1919).
146. On staffing and funding patterns, see Bellow, supra note 11, at 337. See also E.
BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951); J. BRADwAY, LEGAL AID BUREAUS
(1935).
147. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 145, at 269-75. See also Note, Neighborhood Law Of-
fices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REv. 805, 806-09 (1967).
148. See Cahn & Cahn, The War On Poverty: A Civilian Perspectire, 73 YALE LJ. 1317
(1964) (on the history of Community Progress Incorporated); REGULATING THE POOR, supra
note 1, at 290-95 (on the history of Mobilization for Youth).
149. REGULATING THE POOR, supra note 1, at 290, 290-95; Cahn & Cahn, supra note 148,
at 1319 n.7.
150. For OEO history, see E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS
OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 3-102 (1974); J. DONOVAN, THE POLITICS OF POV-
ERTY (2d ed. 1973); Pious, Policy and Public Administration. The Legal Services Program in the
War on Poverty, 1 POLITICS & SOC'Y 365 (1971); Note, supra note 147, at 806-22.
151. For NLSP history, see Pious, supra note 150, at 378-79; Note, supra note 147, at 806;
Note, The Legal Services Corporation: Curtailing Political Interference, 81 YALE L.J. 231
(1971).
152. For NLSC history, see George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 681 (1976); Note, Depoliticizing Legal Aid: A Constitutional Analysis of the
Legal Services Corporation Act, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 734 (1976); Falk & Pollak, PoliticalInter-
ference with Publicly Funded Lawyers: The CRLA Controversy and The Future of Legal Serv-
ices, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 599 (1973); Note, supra note 151, at 259-86.
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out common attributes or bonds.1 53 Documenting this treatment - what I
shall call the process of dependent-individualization - Gary Bellow observes:
The lawyers treat clients and problems individually. No efforts are
made to encourage clients with related problems to meet and talk
with each other, or to explore the possibilities of concerted chal-
lenges to an institution's practices.'54
Dependent-individualization forecloses systematic analysis of the com-
mon experiences of class domination. 155 The consequent narrow treatment of
cases as distinct unrelated disputes, without reference to larger class continu-
ities, sacrifices a valuable opportunity to unmask domination and promote
counter hegemony by organizing around legal controversy.' 56 The opportu-
nity to engage in dialogue regarding the economic, political, and social forces
engendering and surrounding legal conflict is similarly lost.' 7 The failure to
address legal disputes contextually as individual manifestations of class an-
tagonisms inhibits client politicization and class consciousness, thus reinforc-
ing dependence, isolation, passivity, and fragmentation in poor communities.
Attributable to the cultural pull of dominant hegemony, buttressed by
legal education1 58 and professional elan, 15 9 poverty lawyer allegiance to the
153. For an examination of these tendencies, see Bellow, The Legal Aid Puzzle: Turning
Solutions into Problems, 5 WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW Soc'y 52, 55 (1977) [hereinafter The
Legal Aid Puzzle]; Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34
NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977). For a "procedural justice" defense of the direct service strat-
egy within the equal access rights model, see Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual
Analysis, 60 N.C.L. REV. 282, 286 (1982).
154. The Legal Aid Puzzle, supra note 153, at 55. See also Failinger & May, supra note 10,
at 6-7 (arguing that equal access and law reform models are compatible with case selection
procedures and litigation strategies designed to maximize group impact).
155. Bellow comments:
Nor do the lawyers systematically review cases to identify recurring problems, to
deepen their knowledge of the bureaucracies with which they deal, or to expose pub-
licly what they have uncovered. Despite the volume of cases, there are legal services
lawyers who have been handling landlord-tenant or welfare cases for several years
who cannot describe the nature of the housing market in their area or the supervisory
structure of the local welfare department.
The Legal Aid Puzzle, supra note 153, at 55.
156. On rights mobilization, see S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 69, at 131-48; R. KLUOER,
supra note 70, at 450-79, 748-78; C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 70, at 149-220.
157. Simon maintains that "the political realities which create the need for collective ac-
tion are obscured in the ideal of lawyer-and-client as a self-contained relation between individu-
als." Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REv. 487,
504-05 (1980). On rights organizing tactics, see Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79
YALE L.J. 1049 (1970).
158. On the ideological tilt in legal education and the marginalization of the politically and
socially subordinated, see Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and
Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989); Cren-
shaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
1 (1989); Weiss & Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299
(1988); Worden, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal Education, 34
AM. U.L. REV. 1141 (1985); Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40-61 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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perceived historical logic 60 of the practice of dependent-individualization re-
dounds to the detriment of the poor. Individualization blankets class antago-
nisms and shrouds community in Darwinist-tainted liberal theory,"6 a theoryinimical to the evolution of class consciousness and too often impoverishing of
community.
To heal the conceptual schism between the individual-as-self and commu-
nity-as-other undermining liberal theory, Drucilla Cornell urges "the role of
reason as the enhancement of innovative capability," thus reconciling the dis-
tinction between the autonomous subject and the shared community. 6 ' Cor-
nell argues reason permits criticism of self and community in light of the
potential for mutual transformation. The potential embedded in self and in
community is actualized "through the critique of what is and through the
appeal to the might have been and the should be."' 63 Cornell's vision of the
self in terms of "innovative capability" enables poverty lawyers to reconcile
the "sovereign" client with the "otherness" of community through the rea-
soned discourse of transformational dialogue." 6
Poverty lawyers deny the reconciliation of client and community by
pressing ahead with individualization until it brings forth routinization. Rou-
tinization is a formulaic and mechanical convention devised to process indi-
vidual cases on a mass scale.1 65 The by-product of marginalizing traditions,
burgeoning case loads, and meager institutional resources, 66 routinization
159. On the constraints of professional culture, see B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF
PROFESSIONALISM 98-99 (1976); E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 70, at 258-69; Cahn & Cahn,
Power to the People or the Profession? - The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1005 (1970); Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE LJ. 1069 (1970).
160. For a discussion of historical necessity, see E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 138, at 37-50.
161. Individualization may not only obscure a collective experience of injury, but also
redefine the experience in private terms. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transfor-
mation of Disputes Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 631, 631-32 (1980-
81). To reverse this process, poverty lawyers must transform individual legal disputes into col-
lective political struggles. This inversion may be spurred by expanding the "scope of disputing"
into political dimensions. Id. at 644. For a dissection of the individualistic core of classical
liberal theory, see C. MACPHERSON, supra note 16, at 3-4, 263-77.
162. Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential
for Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1135, 1226 (1988).
163. Id. (emphasis in original).
164. Id. Cornell echoes Habermas's notions of communicative ethics and rational consen-
sus. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 92, 111, 142; J. HABERMAS, supra note 37, at 321-26,
335-67.
As Friedman points out, actualization of these notions may be undermined when the
norms and practices of original nonvoluntary communities (e.g., family and neighborhood) or
chosen voluntary communities (e.g., friendships and political action groups) are exploitive and
oppressive. See Friedman, supra note 27, at 277-90.
165. Abel, supra note 55, at 570. On routinization, see J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD & S. MES-
SINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE POOR 22-23 (1966); Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead. Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 119-22, 13941
(1974). Cf. I. BALBUS, THE DIALECTICS OF LEGAL REPRESSION 1-45 (1973); J. EIsENSTmN &
H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 3-64,
190-311 (1977) (analyzing criminal court process of routinization).
166. See Bellow, supra note 11, at 341-43; J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD & S. MESSINGER, supra
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1987-88]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
paradoxically undercuts the logic of individualization. Liberal theory accords
no logic to the routine and standard treatment of the individual poor. 6 '
The genesis of routinization as a convention can be traced to the domi-
nant traditions and institutional economics of poverty law. As Bellow points
out, the "demand for legal services increases with supply." '168 Thus, while
poverty lawyers may "regularly handle 150 to 200 ongoing cases" each year,
nevertheless "in most communities 80 to 90 percent of the need is not being
met."' 16 9 The gravity of this need generates institutional pressure to decrease
the level of "care and energy" devoted to individual cases in order to increase
the aggregate number of cases processed.' 7 °
As a result, individual cases are slotted 7' into standard patterns of advo-
cacy and resolution - notably settlement172 - which fail to encourage client
empowerment and collective opposition. The centrifugal forces of routiniza-
note 165, at 49-50; George, supra note 152, at 709-11. See also Silver, Imminent Failure of
Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to Limit Caseload, 46 J. URB. L. 217 (1969).
167. For a powerful restatement of liberal theory, see J. RAWLS, A THEORY Or. JUSTICE
(1971). But see Miller, Rawls and Marxism, and Daniels, Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of
Liberty, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY OFJusTrcE 206-30,
253-81 (N. Daniels ed. 1975) (condemning Rawls's structural premises and logic).
168. Bellow, supra note 11, at 342; Failinger & May, supra note 10, at 13 ("[T]he demand
for legal services, like that for health services, increases with increases in the supply.") (footnote
omitted).
169. The Legal Aid Puzzle, supra note 153, at 56. Bellow dolefully remarks that the Sisy-
phean task confronting poverty lawyers poses "the uncomfortable choice of either being inun-
dated with cases or dealing with the accompanying strain - not easily understood until one has
done it - of regularly turning needy people away." Bellow, supra note 11, at 342.
170. Bellow, supra note 11, at 342. Bellow's assessment of these institutional pressures and
their ill-effects is sobering. He states:
The pressures on these attorneys, who make up the bulk of the program's stal, to take
the path of least resistance - to convince clients and themselves that nothing much
can be done for them, that additional research or investigation on the case is unneces-
sary, that the result they obtained was all that was possible - is very great indeed.
The net result of these pressures is to induce patterns of practice throughout the legal
aid system which depart substantially from norms of care and competence which I
believe most program people would agree are reasonable to expect in legal services
work.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 50, at 354-55 (describing the
pressures producing the "high volume, minimal service mode of practice" in which "full" repre-
sentation in particular cases is subordinated in order to "help more people").
171. The Legal Aid Puzzle, supra note 153, at 55. In assessing the impact of routinization
and standardization on the disposition of cases, Bellow observes:
Cases not referred to other agencies are typically "slotted" into predictable patterns
getting the client time to move out in an eviction case, working out a payment sched-
ule in a debt case, applying to the appropriate agency in a benefit case. Only rarely do
the lawyers get involved in any research, investigation, or courtroom work. Indeed,
many of the lawyers never leave the office, resolving their cases over the phone. Only
if an "interesting" issue is raised, or if the client is especially attractive or demanding,
will the attorney spend an unusual amount of time, effort, or planning on a particular
case.
Id.
172. Abel, Bellow, Carlin, and Galanter identify the incessant pressures and demands of
settlement as an essential part of the tendency towards routinization and standardization. .
CARLIN, J. HOWARD & S. MESSINGER, supra note 165, at 21-59; Abel, supra note 55, at 572;
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tion and standardization constrain poverty lawyers to distinguish between cli-
ent interest in empowerment and institutional interest in mass processing.
This separation creates a false dichotomy of conflicting attorney/client
interest. 17 3
Poverty lawyers confronted by this dilemma ineluctably yield to institu-
tional persuasion thereby betraying their commitment to individualized ser-
vice. Comforted by the maxim of "doing less for more," they adopt the
methods of routinization and standardization without divulging the elevation
of institutional interest over client interest. Overlooked in this rationalization
is the denigration of the client not only as individual, but also as class agent
and community member.
The rupture between attorney and client interests is endemic, and per-
haps irreparable, given the goals and structure of poverty law programs. The
overriding objective of "minimum access" commands local programs to de-
sign and implement a direct service structure relying heavily on the methods
of routinization and standardization. Implementation shunts aside the alter-
native tradition of client and community empowerment. This ideological
shunting causes poverty lawyers to miss crucial opportunities to weave indi-
vidual cases together in an oppositional strategy of building community organ-
ization and mobilization.
Galanter, supra note 165, at 120-22; The Legal Aid Puzzle, supra note 153, at 56-57. Bellow
asserts:
The Legal Aid lawyer practices in courts where there are persistent demands to settle
every case. Opposing lawyers and agency officials, who are pressed by high caseloads,
want quick, certain resolution, of disputes. For a legal aid lawyer willing to go along
with prevailing settlement patterns, there are many potential benefits: a break now
and then for a client with a weak claim, consideration for the lawyer's busy schedule.
or help in looking good when public performance slips a little. On the other hand,
there can be severe sanctions against the client of the legal services lawyer who won't
cooperate. Most poor clients are vulnerable to harassment by a hostile social worker,
or by the attorney for an angry landlord who can almost always serve the client with a
late-rent eviction notice.
Judges often use similar pressures. The courts want the crowded calendar to
move, whatever the circumstances of particular cases. A surprising number ofjudges
in the last ten years have punished legal aid clients because their lawyers took too
much of the court's time on "frivolous" matters. Some even initiated actions against
particular legal aid programs when they thought the staff departed too dramatically
from regular ways of doing things in the local system.
The potential impact of these sanctions on clients creates considerable pressure to
go along with the bureaucratic rules of the game.
The Legal Aid Puzzle, supra note 153, at 56-57.
173. The implicit assumption in this formulation is that the mass processing of cases is
inconsistent with empowerment both theoretically, because empowerment dialogue is silenced
by the monologue and technical dialogue of the mass processing relation, and practically, be-
cause empowerment dialogue is temporally demanding and thus precluded by the mass process-
ing relation.
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2 Law Reform
The law reform tradition, conceived broadly to encompass test case litiga-
tion and legislative advocacy, 174 stems from the effort to ameliorate the laws
and institutional policies and practices composing the socio-economic struc-
ture of poverty. 175 This effort materialized in 1963 during the incipient devel-
opment of the MFY program in New York, though its early strains may be
uncovered in the late nineteenth century. 176 Engrafted as the welfare progeny
of earlier civil rights desegregation litigation,177 the tradition grew from an
enlarged interpretation of the myth of legal efficacy. 178
While correctly positing the poor's group interest in challenging certain
institutional policies and practices,1 79 the law reform tradition cannot inde-
pendently achieve the goal of empowerment. Framing an attack on a par-
ticular wrong' 80 cannot ipsi dixit unmask domination and liberate conscious-
ness.' In the same way, pressing for judicial creation or enforcement of a
particular rule or doctrine182 cannot redistribute class power. Bellow argues
174. E. JOHNSON, supra note 150, at 130. In a roughly analogous treatment, Lucie White
compares the law reform tradition to the "litigation-centered approach" characteristic of public
interest lawyers. White, supra note 67, at 757. White classifies this style of lawyering as "first-
dimensional," due to its reliance on the courts "as a direct mechanism for redressing the injuries
of class, race, and gender, and for redistributing power to subordinated groups." Id. at 755-58.
175. E. JOHNSON, supra note 150, at 128. See also Failinger & May, supra note 10, at 14-
18.
176. Id. at 23-24, 131. See also R. SMITH, supra note 145, at 200-18.'
177. E. JOHNSON, supra note 150, at 24.
178. Note, supra note 147, at 813-16. A contributing factor, according to Abel, is that law
reform "activity expresses a dynamic of professionalism - the valuation of skilled work for its
own sake, an elevation of technique over extrinsic goals." Abel, supra note 55, at 518 (footnote
omitted).
179. Silver, supra note 166, at 218.
180. Comment, supra note 159, at 1077. Even when framed broadly on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, particularized attacks "tend[ ] to substitute for, rather than fos-
ter, organization . . ." Abel, supra note 55, at 496. Devoid of empowerment, this tendency
may be ineradicable. By comparison, in circumstances antagonistic to political organization,
the tendency may be exploited by initiating a series of class actions on behalf of discrete groups
of individuals attacking a range of particularized wrongs thereby exposing the structures and
relationships of poverty and arousing insurgent resistance.
181. White appears more sanguine on this point asserting specifically fashioned litigation
as a form of "public action with political significance." White, supra note 67, at 758. Classified
as "second-dimensional" lawyering, White claims such litigation possesses "cultural meaning"
representing a "discourse about social justice." Id. (footnote omitted). For White, success in
this approach is measured by a different set of factors, such as public rights education and
political mobilization. Id. at 758-59.
182. Comment, supra note 159, at 1077. Abel adds that law reform litigation may actually
undermine organization by substituting an individual to represent the group interest, or by
bringing a class action because no organized group exists. Abel, supra note 55, at 578-79 (foot-
notes omitted). The critical point overlooked by Abel is the contingent logic of litigation tac-
tics. See Kennedy, supra note 67, at 1064 ("Litigation served as the Negro's most successful
and aggressive form of political activity throughout the first half of this century.") Circum-
stances of group conflict and disarray or political harassment and surveillance may dictate dif-
ferent forms of litigation appropriate to historical time and place. See Scheingold, supra note
56, at 890 ("In more open political settings, grass-roots political organizing by lawyers working
together with community activists has proved feasible.").
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that the law reform tradition in fact misconstrues the nexus connecting law
and class power. 18 3 He states:
The problem of unjust laws is almost invariably a problem of distri-
bution of political and economic power; the rules merely reflect a
series of choices made in response to these distributions. If a major
goal of the unorganized poor is to redistribute power, it is debatable
whether judicial process is a very effective means toward that
end .... "rule" change, without a political base to support it, just
doesn't produce any substantial result because rules are not self-exe-
cuting: they require an enforcement mechanism.184
The insufficiency of the law reform tradition as a method of empower-
ment does not require its outright rejection. To be sure, law reform may blunt
empowerment by failing to raise client and community consciousness. That
failure, coupled with the concentration of decisionmaking authority among
poverty lawyers, also stifles the natural development of client and community
leadership. Likewise, law reform may undermine organizing initiatives by fo-
cusing disputes on the judicial branch, rather than on the politically more
susceptible executive and legislative branches of government, where conflict is
transfigured by formalistic rhetoric.18 5
Nonetheless, law reform should not be viewed as antithetical to empower-
ment.1"6 Carefully tailored, law reform may activate political consciousness
and precipitate the growth of both client and community advocacy organiza-
tions.18 7 Law reform may even establish an interrelationship with client polit-
ical action at once fomenting and defending progressive change. 8 " Creation
183. Comment, supra note 159, at 1077.
184. Id. (quoting Bellow). See also Noble, Fajm Workers Fault Lack of Enforcement of
Sanitation Rules, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1988, at Al, col. 1 ("Just getting regulations on the book
is not enough. The other half is enforcement.") (quoting Valerie Wilk, a health specialist with
the Farmworker Justice Fund).
185. Wexler, supra note 157, at 1062-67; Comment, supra note 159, at 1077-91.
186. Comment, supra note 159, at 1079 (footnote omitted). Failinger and May supply an
inchoate example of an integrated law reform empowerment strategy. They suggest:
A law reform orientation might lead a lawyer to assist a client wanting changes in
nursing home conditions, by helping the client organize a group of similarly minded
nursing home residents, by obtaining media coverage for them to air their grievances
and demands, by aiding the group in drafting petitions and testimony before legislative
committees, and most importantly... by initiating a class action law suit against the
owners of the nursing home. In this way, the initial unequal power relationship that
existed between the poor person and the nursing home owners might be overcome
with the additional possibility of far-reaching changes for nursing home residents
other than the individual who came to the Legal Services office.
Failinger & May, supra note 10, at 15.
187. Comment, supra note 159, at 1091. Here, White's "second-dimensional" litigation
claim to the contingent expansion of "public consciousness about justice" and mobilization of
"direct action for change" seems more appropriately modest. White, supra note 67, at 760.
188. Comment, supra note 159, at 1083-89. Abel maintains that "structural reform" of
this kind "thrives only when lawyers are subordinated to other political activists." Abel, supra
note 55, at 518 (footnotes omitted).
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of this dynamic requires a providently designed and executed law reform strat-
egy centered on political action, a strategy driven by the engine of politics.
B. Alternative Traditions and Oppositional Continuities
Instead of approaching dominant poverty law traditions in strategic can-
dor, lawyers veil these traditions in mystification. Resting on the logic of
predisposed continuity, they offer the two traditions as natural and even neces-
sary extensions of past values and practices of celebrated legitimacy. 189 No
mention is made of the specific political and socio-historical character or ideo-
logical content of the traditions.
The presentation of direct service and law reform litigation as self-ratify-
ing traditions signals a failure by poverty lawyers to grasp the acontextual and
ahistorical nature of their world view. To be authentic, ratification must come
from without, from contextual practice and historical experience, not from
self-serving affirmations. It is these affirmations that have salvaged the tradi-
tions of direct service and law reform when historical experience demanded
their reformation. Their rescue marks not a ratification of absolute value, but
a ratification of dominant hegemony.
Williams argues the clinging embrace of tradition is a powerful process
fastened to places, institutions, and language, and hence directly exper-
ienced.1 90 Because that process is turbulent - battered by the reinterpreta-
tion, dilution, and conversion of cultural conventions and forms - it is also
vulnerable. 191 This vulnerability is displayed at "vital points of connection,
where a version of the past is used to ratify the present and to indicate direc-
tions for the future .... 192
Each day in the conventions of practice - interviewing, counseling, ne-
gotiation, investigation, drafting - poverty lawyers experience vital points of
cultural connection between the poor, the state, and society. These connec-
tions reinforce a deformed version of the poor derived from a mystified past
and apply it to ratify and project a present as well as a future version of the
poor. None of these versions, however, renders an accurate portrait.
To obtain a fuller version of the poor and to exploit the vulnerability of
dominant traditions at points of cultural connection, Williams adjures the re-
covery of "discarded" traditions and the redress of "selective and reductive
interpretations." 193 Recovery and redress are possible, according to Williams,
189. R. WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 116.
190. Id.
191. Id. The vulnerability of tradition to appropriation and reconstitution recalls Jacques
Derrida's concept of the "free 'play' of text." Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory,
96 Yale L.J. 743, 777 (1987) (quoting J. DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 292 (1978)).
For probing introductions to deconstruction, structuralism, and poststructuralism, see J.
CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM (1982);
Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1984). For a critical summary of
Derrida's methods of analysis, see Brosnan, supra note 104, at 360-76.
192. R. WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 116 (emphasis in original).
193. Id.
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because the "real record" as well as many "alternative or opposing practical
continuities" are still available waiting to be unearthed. 94
For Williams, the selective version of dominant traditions is always
moored to "contemporary pressures and limits."'19  When these moorings
snap, dominant traditions may be deprived of contextual verification. Unob-
scured by rationalization, the contradictions and deceptions of dominant tra-
ditions then may be recognized and subverted.1 96 In the light of contradiction,
Williams tells us dominant hegemony can be broken.
The lesson in Williams's analysis lies in the importance he attaches to the
recovery of the discarded traditions of the dissident poor, and to the redress of
selective and reductive interpretations of their human nature and history. In
crucial respects, these traditions are bound up in notions of community and
solidarity. 197 The traditions are part of the real record of the poor and can be
traced as historical continuities of thought and action. 198 Together, they com-
prise a counter hegemony.
Poverty lawyers overlook the alternative traditions and blur the opposi-
tional continuities of the poor. This myopia is the fruit of selective and reduc-
tive interpretation of human nature and history. Poverty lawyers daily
employ selective and reductionist methods of interpretation in their relations
with poor clients, effectively labeling' 99 them a fractured, unrelated mass of
dependent "dissociated individuals." 2' Labeling is itself an act of demeaning
subordination.
C. Language
The language 1 of dominant poverty law traditions privileges the norms
194. Id.
195. Id. at 117.
196. Id. Subversion comports with the deconstructive premise that hidden ideological hi-
erarchies underlying language and thought can be identified, inverted, and liberated. Balkin,
supra note 191, 74446. For a cogent illustration, see Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of
Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1007-09 (1985). Compare Brosnan, supra note 104, at
376-88 (appraising Dalton's derivative deconstructive method).
197. Unger describes solidarity in terms of concern and responsibility shared with another
person. He states: "Solidarity is the social face of love." R. UNGER, supra note 7, at 206.
198. For a canvass of this history, see POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 1-40,
264-361; IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE, supra note 1, at 206-73.
199. On labeling theory and its insidious application by public interest lawyers, see Mi-
now, When Difference Has Its Home. Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection
and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111 (1987).
200. C. MACPHERSON, supra note 16, at 1.
201. On the constitutive power of language to shape values, norms, and assumptions re-
garding human possibilities for transcendence and solidarity, see M. EDEULAN, THE SYMBOLIC
USES OF POLITICS 190 (1964); C. MUELLER, THE POLrrcs OF COMMUNICATION: A STUDY
IN THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE, SOCIALIZATION, AND LEGITIMATION (1973).
The language of the direct service and law reform traditions shapes the values, norms, and
assumptions held by the poor concerning the human possibilities of empowerment in their own
lives and communities. No doubt this process operates on both conscious and unconscious
levels. In either event, the process is pernicious in its subtle demarcation of the realm of the
possible. As the literature of a society both mirrors and distorts the reflection of social reality,
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of lawyer domination and control.2 °2 These norms are closed rather than
open to possibility, repressive rather than liberating in vision. Bellow aptly
describes the forms and terms of the normative language pervading the attor-
ney/client relationship when he states:
The lawyers dominate interaction with clients. In most discussions
with clients, the lawyer does almost all of the talking, gives little
opportunity for the client to express his or her feelings or concerns,
and consistently controls the length, topic, and character of the con-
versation. Facts are obtained by a series of pointed, standard ques-
tions rather than by any process that resembles a dialogue. The
lawyer then restates the client's problems in legal terms and suggests
the best available solutions based on his or her view of the situation
and its possibilities. 0 3
Within the attorney/client relation, therefore, the "production of dis-
course" is controlled, selected, and organized by norms which exclude the
client voice.2 ' This system of exclusion or silencing is maintained by status
and power hierarchies. 205 These hierarchies rest on the authoritative roles and
identities reified by the attorney/client relationship.
In deconstructive practice, linguistic signs and metaphors represent
"privileged conceptions of social reality. '2 6 As such, they are neither self-
sufficient nor value-neutral structures. Instead, they are ideologies of a hierar-
chical social life. Because ideologies obtain legitimacy from the denial or ex-
clusion of alternative possibilities of social life, real or potential, they are
subject to contest.20 7 The crux of deconstructive practice is to seize, affirm,
and emancipate those human possibilities denied or excluded by dominant
modes of discourse. °8
D. Williams v. Axelrod
The infirmities passed on by dominant poverty law traditions often con-
spire to marginalize the poor under the rubric of aid. Marginalization may be
sustained even where the poor are in fact aided. This process is illustrated by
so too does its language. See R. WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 21-54; T. EAGLETON, supra note
6, at 194-217.
202. The Legal Aid Puzzle, supra note 153, at 55.
203. Id.
204. Foucault, The Order of Discourse, in LANGUAGE AND POLITICS 108, 109 (M. Shapiro
ed. 1984).
205. Edelman, The Political Language of the Helping Professions, in LANGUAGE AND
POLITICS, supra note 204, at 44, 45-60.
206. Balkin, supra note 191, at 764.
207. Relying on Derrida, Dalton notes the disfavored conception - here, the client voice
denied, excluded, and silenced - harbors the "dangerous" potential of revelation, of disclosing
that "things are not, after all, what they seem." Dalton, supra note 196, at 1007 (footnote
omitted).
208. Balkin, supra note 191, at 763-65.
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a mixed direct service/law reform case, Williams v. Axelrod,2 r 9 recently liti-
gated in New York State Supreme Court. In Williams, poverty lawyers com-
menced an Article 7821 proceeding on behalf of Deon Williams, a two-year-
old child suffering from sickle-cell anemia and related nutritional impair-
ments, against David Axelrod, Commissioner of the New York State Depart-
ment of Health, and Dosoon G. Min, Director of the Bronx-Lebanon Hospital
Center Women, Infants, and Children Program.2 ' The Williams lawyers
complained these officials had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and erroneously
in disqualifying the child from participation in the state-wide WIC program
and in depriving him of recertification.212
Alleging that deprivation of WIC benefits had caused the child physical
hardship, including weight loss and deteriorating health, 1 3 the Williams law-
yers petitioned the court for relief annulling the challenged decisions.214 Ad-
ditionally, they sought a declaration that the disqualification and denial of
recertification violated the Child Nutrition Act and its federal implementing
regulations, as well as the New York State and United States Constitutions. 15
Moreover, they sought to reinstate the child in the WIC program and restore
all benefits unlawfully withheld.2"6
Finding that the child fulfilled all WIC program requirements and rea-
soning therefore that his parent's actions as a non-participant could not affect
his eligibility, the supreme court concluded the child had been unlawfully dis-
209. See Williams v. Axelrod, 133 Misc. 2d 817, 508 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Sup. Ct. 1986). The
author served as a member of the litigation team representing the Williams family.
210. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1988).
211. 133 Misc. 2d at 818-19. The court found the child's impairments to include "im-
peded" physical development evidenced by "inadequate bone formation, slowly developed
speech abilities, and general sluggishness." Id.
212. Id. See also Petitioner's Verified Petition at 11 13-26, Williams (Dec. 23, 1985); Peti-
tioner's First Amended Verified Petition at 91 13-26, Williams (Feb. 5, 1986). The child Deon
Williams, appearing by his parent and guardian Doris Williams, was accepted as a WIC pro-
gram participant at birth in August, 1983. Affidavit of Doris Williams at f 5, Irlliams (Dec.
23, 1985).
In August, 1985, Min disqualified the child from WIC program participation because his
parent Doris Williams, a non-participant, assaulted a member of the Bronx-Lebanon Hospital
Center WIC program staff. 133 Misc. 2d at 818. After review at an administrative law judge
hearing, Axelrod upheld the disqualification and denial of recertification. Id. at 819.
213. Petitioner's First Amended Verified Petition, supra note 212, at 10.
214. Id. at 9 (a)-(b).
215. Id. at 9 (c), (f), (g)-(h).
216. Id. at 99 (j)-(k). Furthermore, the lawyers requested an award of compensatory dam-
ages, including out-of-pocket food expenses, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Id. at
(a)-(m), (o)-(p).
Having alleged the state's failure to promulgate rules and regulations governing WIC pro-
gram participant sanctions, in claimed violation of federal regulation and the New York State
Administrative Procedure Act, the lawyers also sought relief declaring and enjoining immediate
regulatory promulgation. Id. at 1 15-16, (d), (n).
In settlement, Min awarded the child $1000 in damages, and the lawyers' legal aid pro-
gram $6100 for attorneys' fees and costs. Petitioner's General Release, Williams (June 13,
1986).
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qualified as punishment for parental misconduct.217 With this conclusion, the
court held the challenged decisions were thus arbitrary, capricious, and con-
trary to law. 18 Consequently, the court ordered reinstatement of the child's
certification at the Bronx-Lebanon Hospital Center WIC program and resto-
ration of all WIC benefits withheld during his period of disqualification.2 19
Pressed by the exigencies of circumstance220 and the potential import of
altruistic rule expansion, the Williams lawyers departed from the tradition of
direct service routinization. Nonetheless, they failed to withstand the ten-
dency of decontextualization and atomization manifested in the continued iso-
lation and disconnection of the Williams family from other WIC clients and
the larger welfare community. That tendency, part of the process of depen-
dent-individualization, went unnoticed and unbridled.
The garnering of a settlement award of damages for the Williams family
did not reverse this process and the accompanying reproduction of depen-
dence, isolation, and passivity. These reified myths of helplessness were as real
at the outset of the Williams litigation as they were at the close. The negation
of class and class consciousness was similarly constant throughout the
litigation.
Framed in terms of empowerment theory, Williams required poverty law-
yers to synchronize 2 ' the vindication of the child's individual interest in
regaining WIC benefits with the activization of community interest in improv-
ing the WIC program as well as similar welfare programs. Harmonization of
these mutual interests necessitated attorney/client engagement in dialogue,
specifically in socio-economic and political discourse relevant to enhancing
community health and nutrition. 2 ' Amplification of that discourse warranted
meetings between the Williams family and other WIC client families to create
a client/client study group. Further expansion of discourse entailed the par-
ticipation of the surrounding community, especially neighborhood churches,
clinics, day care centers, schools, and self-help associations, in organizing
community consciousness raising and action groups.
Client/client and client/community discourse might have commenced
with a series of small informational meetings regarding the nature of the WIC
217. Williams v. Axelrod, 133 Misc. 2d 817, 821-22 (Sup. Ct. 1986). Although acknowl-
edging the state's interest in protecting WIC agency staff from harm, the court stressed the
importance of alternative means to achieve this legitimate goal short of terminating the benefits
of an eligible and needy WIC program child participant. Id. at 822.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 823.
220. The Williams lawyers secured a temporary restraining order on December 24, 1985,
from the New York State Supreme Court enjoining Axelrod from continuing to deny the child
current WIC benefits, pending a full hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction. See
Petitioner's Order to Show Cause, Williams (Dec. 24, 1985).
221. Cornell, supra note 162, at 1226.
222. The historian J.G.A. Pocock deems "verbalization itself as a political act." Pocock,
Verbalizing a Political Act: Towards a Politics of Speech, in LANGUAGE AND POLITICS, supra
note 204, at 25 (emphasis in original).
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program, particularly its controlling rules and regulations on matters of eligi-
bility and participation. Out of these meetings an organizing committee might
have formed to call forth a plenary community meeting specifically to address
the WIC program and related health and welfare issues. From this meeting,
clients and community members might have planned numerous actions, from
study groups to demonstrations, including establishing a physical presence
(e.g., an advocacy table) at or outside local WIC programs to distribute infor-
mation and aid independent client action.
Bounded by tradition, these opportunities for empowerment were left
unexploited in Williams. Deprived of discourse, neither the Williams family
nor their lawyers were able to engage in a joint effort to educate, organize, and
mobilize similarly aggrieved individuals, groups, and communities. Even the
basic groundwork of attorney/client and client/client dialogue - discourse
on socio-economic history and political strategy, consciousness raising meet-
ings, and study groups - was neglected.
With the exception of standard attorney/client interviews, no meaningful
dialogue was established between poverty lawyers and the Williams family.
Accordingly, the monologue and technical dialogue of the traditional attor-
ney/client relation prevailed. Nor were rights deconstructed and synthesized
to expose their contextual and transcendent nature. Thus, the transforma-
tional potential of dialogue, client organization, and community mobilization
was dismissed. In sum, the preconditions - critical consciousness and dia-
logue - for empowerment were discarded, and with them the alternative tra-
ditions and oppositional continuities of the poor accumulated in their long
struggle against state sanctioned poverty.
III.
DIALOGIC EMPOWERMENT
The salutary results procured in Williams and like cases ratify the relative
value of dominant poverty law traditions, but leave a tragic legacy for the
poor.223 Tragic because those traditions are mired in an orthodoxy that ulti-
mately marginalizes the poor. The attorney/client relation stands at the epi-
center of this marginalization.
By seizing upon a critical theory of class and class consciousness," 4 pov-
erty lawyers can unfetter that relation. Although this seizure may occur ab-
stractly, its application must be grounded concretely in the daily cultural
experiences of the poor. To connect with and share in these experiences, and
thereby facilitate a transformation in the social role of the individual poor and
223. Cf. C.V. WOODWARD, ToM WVATSON: AGRARIAN REBEL iv (1938) (describing agra-
rian Populist battles as "the tragedy of a class, and more especially the tragedy of a section").
224. On the foundations of critical theory, see M. JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION:
A HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTrrUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 1923-50,
at 41-85 (1973).
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the social organization of poor communities, poverty lawyers must enter into a
transformational dialogue with the poor.
A. Dialogue
The notion of dialogue has been most profoundly explored by the theolo-
gian Martin Buber.225 Buber establishes a relational theory of dialogue her-
alding the sanctity of the "primary word I-Thou" as an open mutual world of
relation.226 To Buber, this "primary word can only be spoken with the whole
being. He who gives himself to it may withhold nothing of himself." '227
Buber's notion of dialogue as a direct meeting involving affirmation of the
other in a lived relation explains the division and separation between poverty
lawyers and the poor.228 Poverty lawyers withhold relation. They hesitate to
"step into direct relation" with the poor.229 Without this step into the "soli-
darity" of dialogic relation, there can be no connection or community, no
union or unity between attorney and client.23 °
Buber exhorts poverty lawyers to destroy the "barrier of separation" and
embrace "real relation in the world" of the poor.2al Real relation is marked
by "individuation" and the "interchange of actual and potential being. '232
The "world of relation" consists of many "moments of relation" encompass-
ing different spheres, each part of a "process of becoming., 233 This process
emerges from the act of relation, from the "wholefulness of real mutual
action. ' 234
Buber's teachings plant the foundation for a theory of transformational
dialogue. From his relational premise, a theory of dialogue can be constructed
intertwining the values of directness, mutuality, and openness into an other-
affirming whole. Within that world of relation, poverty lawyers and the poor
can experience the union of connection and the unity of community.
Riven by marginalizing tendencies, the attorney/client relation has shat-
tered into a cracked monologue or at best a technical dialogue of lawyer domi-
225. M. BUBER, I AND THOU (1937) [hereinafter I AND THOU]; M. BUBER, BETWEEN
MAN AND MAN 1-39 (1947) [hereinafter BETWEEN MAN AND MAN]. For lucid commentary,
see R. ARNETT, COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY: IMPLICATIONS OF MARTIN BUBER'S
DIALOGUE (1986); M. FRIEDMAN, To DENY OUR NOTHINGNESS: CONTEMPORARY IMAGES
OF MAN 17-27, 281-306, 357-73 (1967).
226. I AND THOU, supra note 225, at 4, 6, 8-9, 15.
227. Id. at 10-11.
228. Id. at 11-12, 16, 18, 27, 43.
229. Id. at 76. Direct relation here implies seeing the social world from the standpoint of
the subordinated client. See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW 43 (1987). This approach to interpersonal relations of dominance is avowedly femi-
nist. Id.
230. I AND THOU, supra note 225, at 63, 45, 59, 86-87.
231. Id. at 77, 99-100.
232. Id. at 99, 100.
233. Id. at 101, 103, 101.
234. Id. at 109, 110.
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nation.2 35 To repair this relation and restore dialogue, poverty lawyers must
address and penetrate the marginalized social role of the poor. This role is
characterized by cultural and socio-historical signs.3 6
The prosaic signs of the poor are easily recognized. They are expressed in
variations of ethnicity, gender, race, and class, in characterizations of depen-
dence, isolation, and passivity, and in the language of acquiescence, compli-
ance, and deference. The liberating signs of the poor, the signs of potential
being and historical becoming, are more opaque. These signs are embedded in
particular social roles and forms of organization.
Gramsci and Genovese expose the roots of these roles and formations,
locating them in the historical continuities and traditions of class and hege-
monic conflict. Thompson and Williams, as well as Foucault and Habermas,
provide insight into the manner in which those roots saturate the whole body
of lived experience, thus shaping the full realm of consciousness including per-
ception, interpretation, and vision. But it is Freire and Buber who supply a
method of shedding a lived domination by reaching out" and embracing the
potential of the individual poor, cooperatively decoding 8 signs of domina-
tion, culling alternative and oppositional thematics, 239 and reconstructing
those thematics in collective transformational dialogue.
Transformational dialogue cannot spring serendipitously from the attor-
ney/client relation. Nor can it be boiled down to a formula conjured or in-
canted. Transformational dialogue is instead a relational process of mutual
unfolding between the attorney and client in direct and open meeting.24°
Relational unfolding is a process of communication comprised of speech
and gesture as well as silence.241 It is a discourse between the attorney and the
client-as-other in which the attorney does not merely observe and look upon
235. BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, supra note 225, at 19-21.
236. Id. at 10-13.
237. Id. at 21.
238. P. FREIRE, supra note 19, at 96-118. Freire employs decoding as a deconstructive
method of critical analysis applied concretely to penetrate socially constructed situations and
reveal objective meaning. Id. at 96.
239. Id. at 86-95. Freire utilizes thematics to capture the limiting (i.e., dominated) and
liberating (i.e., generative) elements, folkways, and traditions pervading specific historical con-
texts. Id. at 86-95. The dialogic process of decoding takes place in "thematic investigation
circles." Id. at 110 (footnote omitted). The investigation proceeds from Freire's central prem-
ise of "educational action as liberating cultural action." Id. at 110 n.32.
The form and method of Freire's investigation are analogous to the feminist consciousness
raising group. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow explains:
this particular form of organization is more than a form; it is a methodology that
creates knowledge from shared, collective experience. Communication occurs in a
leaderless circle, and in some groups attention is paid to equality of presentation time
and rotation of instrumental and affective tasks. There is a devaluation of expertise;
everyone has life experiences from which something might be worth learning.
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice." Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, I
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 55 (1985).
240. White merges Freire's pedagogy and the feminist method of consciousness raising in
classifying the work of "third dimensional" lawyers. White, supra note 67, at 760-66.
241. BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, supra note 225, at 3-6.
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the client-as-symbol, but becomes aware of the client-as-historical-actor apart
from her marginalized social role as client-recipient.242 This coming of aware-
ness requires poverty lawyers to renounce prevailing mythologies and genu-
inely respond to the client-as-other, as an historical actor.24
Renunciation of debasing mythology alone is insufficient to meet the poor
in transformational dialogue. Real relation requires the further repudiation of
those habits tending to negate class and class consciousness, and decontextual-
ize and atomize common struggle. Unless these habits of mind are rejected,
the process of dependent-individualization will continue undeterred.
Transformational dialogue reverses that process. In its place, it substi-
tutes the process of dialogic-individuation within a growing community of
others.2" This alternative process encompasses three dialogic moments in
corresponding relational spheres. These moments constitute interdependent
points of empowerment.245
B. Attorney/Client Dialogue
The first moment of dialogue occurs in the sphere of the attorney/client
relation. Here dialogue arises from faith, practical wisdom, respect, and sym-
pathy. Each of these elements implies mutuality, a shared sense of direct and
open engagement by the poverty lawyer and individual client.
Faith24 6 denotes fidelity and trust.247 It also connotes genuine and sin-
cere belief, a kind of authenticity of motive. Practical wisdom describes rea-
soning that is principled and rooted in everyday experience. 24 It suggests
considered judgment informed by the ordinary lessons of everyday life.249
242. Id. at 8-10.
243. Id. at 16-17. On human responsiveness, see G. MORGAN, THE HUMAN PREDICA-
MENT: DISSOLUTION AND WHOLENESS 306-12 (1968).
244. BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, supra note 225, at 30-32.
245. Habermas defines these moments as points of "self-supporting higher-level intersub-
jectivities." J. HABERMAS, supra note 37, at 364.
246. Freire claims dialogue "requires an intense faith in man, faith in his power to make
and remake, to create and re-create, faith in his vocation to be more fully human ...." P.
FREIRE, supra note 19, at 79. He proclaims: "Faith in man is an a priori requirement for
dialogue; the 'dialogical man' believes in other men even before he meets them face to face." Id.
See also P. TILLICH, PERSPECTIVES ON 19TH & 20TH CENTURY PROTESTANT THEOLOGY 168-
76 (C. Braaten ed. 1967) (critique of Kierkegaardian faith); M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME
322 (1962) (describing the "call of care" as discourse).
247. The interconnection between trust and "good will" is affirmed by Joel Handler in
extending the work of Annette Baier, see Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Mod-
ern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1077-79 (1988);
Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 234-35 (1986). See also Simon, supra note 51, at 133
(defining trust as "a quality which the parties must create or fail to create in each instance.").
248. In Freire's lexicon, practical wisdom flows from "praxis: the action and reflection of
men upon their world in order to transform it." P. FREIRE, supra note 19, at 66.
249. Freire recognizes that "the present, existential, concrete situation" of everyday life
furnishes the "starting point for organizing the program content of education or political ac-
tion." Id. at 85. From daily life, Freire suggests, "certain basic contradictions" can be discov-
ered and posed to the poor "as a problem which challenges them and requires a response - not
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Respect2 50 defines an imparted deference to independent decisionmaking
and an honoring of individual client choice and preference." In this way,
respect follows from the cultivation of faith and practical wisdom.252 Sympa-
thy is an ethic and ideal of shared ends experienced in the relation between self
and others.253 For Unger, "[c]ommunity begins with sympathy."' -
The reaching out of empowerment begins in the first moment of dialogue
within the attorney/client relation. At this meeting, the poverty lawyer must
engage the individual client in a direct and open discourse concerning the
myths of legal efficacy and ingrained indigent isolation and passivity. 2 " This
discourse inaugurates the task of redressing and rebuilding reductive interpre-
tations of the poor.
Where domination is interpreted and interiorized as dependence and self-
depreciation, discourse may fall short. In this circumstance, the client must be
encouraged to reassess her expectations of lawyer-engineered legal efficacy and
to consider alternative insurgent traditions discarded by dominant poverty law
traditions. Client reassessment of the myth of legal efficacy is guided by the
concept of legal superstructure analysis." 6 This analysis examines the nature
just at the intellectual level, but at the level of action." Id. (footnote omitted). This process of
discovery and response instructs from the ordinary lessons of domination.
250. Unger denotes respect as a common duty founded on equal dignity and individual
distinctiveness. R UNGER, supra note 7, at 207.
251. Stephen Ellmann recommends a course of practice "in support of clients' autonomy"
marked by "the client's enjoyment of the opportunity to choose, his attainment of the capacity
to choose, and his full exercise of that capacity." Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L
REV. 717, 776-77 (1987). Ellmann asserts:
The guiding goal of such a practice is that a lawyer should strive to enable her client
not only to know what choices await him, but also to reach full decisionmaking capac-
ity, and then she should participate in her client's exercise of that capacity by offering
information, legal advice, and those other perspectives, be they moral or political, that
constitute the "fullness of [her] experience."
Id. at 777. See also Ellmann, Reply - Manipulation by Client and Context: A Response to
Professor Morris, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1003-22 (1987). See generally D. BINDER & S. PRICE,
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 147-55 (1977).
252. Respect can be exhibited in both large and small gestures. In neighborhood offices,
for example, the poverty lawyer should seek to greet, accompany, and dispatch her individual
clients. This and other small gestures, such as the flexible scheduling of evening, weekend or
on-site appointments and interviews, as well as qualified involvement in family support (e.g.,
referrals for counseling and sheltering of battered children and women) and community out-
reach (e.g., attendance at community meetings), help build rapport and trust.
253. See R. UNGER, supra note 22, at 22, 141-42, 217, 220.
254. Id. at 262.
255. At the initial client interview, the poverty lawyer should carefully explain office case
selection and retainer procedures, and the limited resources of the office relative to the magni-
tude of client and community grievances. This preparatory explanation is only the first step
towards demystifying the advocacy process and involving the client/community as an active
participant in that process. Cf. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 251, at 64-72 (proffering a
more narrow construction of preparatory explanation). The subject of office case selection and
resources, particularly their definitive limits, affords the client a first opportunity to grasp the
importance of client/community advocacy organizations.
256. The premise of legal superstructure analysis is client knowledge and decisionmaking.
To that end, the attorney/client dialogue should include a basic explanation of the judicial
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of both legal institutions - courts, governmental agencies, and advocacy or-
ganizations - and legal ideology - constitutionalism, and statutory and com-
mon law jurisprudence. The purpose of the analysis is to enable clients to
gather a rough understanding of the potential and limits of social change ac-
crued through direct service and law reform litigation. The goal in enlarging
the breadth of discourse is to move the client beyond a subordinate posture of
passive lawyer reliance towards an active, participatory recovery of insurgent
community traditions." 7
Boyte recounts that people engaged in the process of recovering an oppo-
sitional history of insurgency "draw upon rich cultural resources and tradi-
tions from the past, unearthing subversive themes of protest, dignity, dissent,
and self-assertion, and fashioning them into foundations for a new culture."2 '
By drawing from indigenous sources of cultural dissent, insurgent movements
ensure a continuity and vitality of opposition.259
Demythologizing dominant poverty law traditions in order to recover al-
ternative traditions and oppositional continuities does not - and should not
- preclude the employment of the methods of direct service and law reform
litigation26° as instruments of counter hegemonic education,261 protection,262
system, its courts, judges, personnel, rules, and folkways. The explanation should note the at-
tendant limits of the judicial process as an instrument of affirmative social change and the ra-
diating force of class, gender, and racial prejudice throughout that process.
Similar analysis should be applied to governmental agencies and their private affiliates re-
sponsible for promulgating and implementing welfare policies and practices. As seen in Wil-
liams, these agencies and their personnel exercise decisive power over the lives of client-
recipients. Williams v. Axelrod, 133 Misc. 2d 817, 508 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Sup. Ct. 1986), It is
essential, therefore, that poverty lawyers discuss with clients agency structure, operation, and
susceptibility to legal and political attack.
Likewise, legal superstructure analysis should review and summarize, in a simplified form,
the substance of the constitutional, statutory, and decisional law impinging upon client griev-
ances. This is not to suggest that clients should be entangled in the complexity of federal or
state law, but instead to emphasize that clients should be supplied the opportunity to learn the
substantive foundations of specific litigation. Without this background, clients will be unable to
participate meaningfully in the planning of litigation tactics and strategy. This learning oppor-
tunity should be supplemented by self-help handbooks and manuals.
257. On American insurgent traditions, see T. BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS:
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1988); D. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 431-624
(1988); H. ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 247-397, 435-569 (1980); L.
GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN
AMERICA 97-124 (1978).
258. H. BoYTE, supra note 84, at 179.
259. Id. at xii. As Taylor Branch points out in his incisive history of the civil rights move-
ment, the vitality of dissent may continue across the dividing lines of class and race. See T.
BRANCH, supra note 257, at 143-205, 451-91 (1988) (contrasting the Montgomery bus boycott
and the Freedom Rides).
260. Habermas approves this conversion of method as the "critical appropriation of tradi-
tion." J. HABERMAS, supra note 6, at 70-71.
261. William Simon puts forth a critical vision of practice "as a process of constituting or
reconstituting nonhierarchical communities of interest." Simon, supra note 60, at 485. He en-
visions situations "in which the client is encouraged to enter into nonhierarchical relationships
by the experience of solidarity and another in which she is empowered to withdraw from or
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and positive insurgent growth. Mounting the instruments and institutions of
the law either to safeguard or strengthen the rights of the poor, however, re-
quires a prior deconstruction and synthesis of rights theory. This synthesis
combines the concepts of individual and class rights in a unified, multi-dimen-
sional theory of contextual and transcendent rights.
The discourse of multi-dimensional rights theory should be held even
though the individual client may articulate a limited rights demand. In com-
parison to Williams, where the client's rights demand was couched narrowly
in terms of regaining WIC benefits, the poverty lawyer should not readily ac-
cept such a crabbed interpretation of entitlement. Nor, by contrast, should
she disrespect the client's rights demand. Rather, she should focus discourse
on the historical derivation of that narrow, particularized statutory right, es-
pecially the economic, political, and social collision of interests underlying its
development. At the same time, she should focus on the potential evolution of
a broader, more comprehensive nutritional right, a right universal in scope.
By focusing on multi-dimensional rights theory in the "real, concrete,
historical situation" '263 of rights demand, the attorney/client dialogue may ele-
vate immediate fights demand to transcendent rights aspiration. The enlarge-
ment of rights demand from a contextual to a transcendent dimension is
necessary to counterbalance the regressive forces of atomization and negation.
In this respect, multi-dimensional rights theory vindicates the contextual
rights demand of the individual client while inculcating transcendent rights
aspiration on behalf of the client historical class. 2
C. Client/Client Dialogue
The second moment of dialogue occurs in the sphere of the client/client
challenge hierarchical ones." Id. (footnote omitted). These situations may be realized in client/
client and client/community dialogue and collective opposition.
262. In his critique of CLS scholars, Richard Delgado points out: "Rights do, at times,
give pause to those who would otherwise oppress [minorities]." Delgado, supra note 41, at 305.
He adds, "[fior minorities .. that rights minimize many forms of coercion is of enormous
importance." Id. at 306. See also Kennedy, supra note 67, at 1062-63 (emphasizing the value
of formal rights in protecting blacks against invidious racial discrimination); Crenshaw, supra
note 41, at 1384-85 (characterizing rights as "the means by which oppressed groups have se-
cured both entry as formal equals into the dominant order and the survival of their movement
in the face of private and state oppression."); Williams, supra note 41, at 413 (defending rights
as measures of actual entitlement providing protection against genuine vulnerability).
This point applies with equal force to the safeguarding rights of the poor, and likewise, to
women "who are not in a position to abandon hard-won rights for the ephemeral promise or
direct political struggle." Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALF. L. REv. 1279,
1283 n.24 (1987) (citation omitted). See also Scales-Trent, supra note 61, at 40-41 (claiming
that the assertion of rights is the only source of protection for dispossessed black women).
263. P. FREIRE, supra note 19, at 185.
264. The germination of transcendent rights theory is found in Freire's analysis of cultural
synthesis and the "deception of palliative solutions." Id. See also Matsuda, supra note 41, at
333 (describing an aspirational vision of law as part of the experience of people of color);
Schneider, supra note 41, at 629 (presenting the linkage between the specific experiences of
women and the universal claim of rights in women's rights discourse).
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relation. As with the attorney/client relation, client/client dialogue emerges
from the mutual affirmation of the client-as-other in direct and open meeting.
The unfolding of dialogue from the individual interchange of client/client re-
lation is a critical facet of empowerment. The evolution of community, class,
and class consciousness is untenable without client/client dialogic relation.
The centrality of this relation is trampled by dominant poverty law tradi-
tions. William Simon observes "neither communication among clients nor di-
rect client participation is valued" by these traditions. 26 This devaluation
contrasts against his own proffered "[c]ritical notion that a community of in-
terest is something to be created in the course of representation. 2 66 On this
view, the creation of client relational community becomes linked to "commu-
nication among clients and direct participation." '267 Consistent with empow-
erment, "[c]ommunication among clients and direct participation are valued
for their potential to increase understanding and solidarity and to safeguard
against hierarchy. ' z62
Client/client relational communication and participation requires not
only the proliferation of client voices, but also the extension of discourse to the
subjects of socio-economic history and political strategy. Experience shows
this discourse may sprout naturally between attorney and client, as well as
among clients, in poverty-law offices, welfare agency waiting rooms, court-
room halls, church basements, and tenement stairwells.269
When words empower, they may facilitate client socio-economic identifi-
cation and class affiliation first in local communities, then gradually in state
and national communities. For example, a WIC recipient confronted, as in
Williams, by benefit termination caused by hostile and uncooperative agency
officials should be told of similarly situated recipients represented by the pov-
erty lawyer's office in the local community. The client should be further ad-
vised of the shared political and socio-economic status - as unrepresented or
underrepresented social class - of those recipients both in the community and
in wider state and national communities. Additionally, she should be apprised
of the history of these local, state, and national client communities, particu-
larly regarding the formation of political alliances.
Once the client understands she is part of an oppressed political commu-
nity, not simply an individual isolated and disconnected in her experience of
oppression, she should be encouraged to join client study and consciousness
raising groups and client/community advocacy organizations. Conceding that
265. Simon, supra note 60, at 487. Simon conflates the dominant direct service and law
reform traditions into the inclusive concept of "established professional culture" or "profes-
sional vision." Id. at 469, 487.
266. Id. at 487.
267. Id.
268. Id. (footnote omitted).
269. Doubtless, even the most balanced and circumspect methods of discourse may
quickly deteriorate into lawyer domination and manipulation. See Ellmann, supra note 251, at
719-33. To safeguard against this marginalizing tendency, poverty lawyers must eschew domi-
nance and manipulation and strive to realize Buberian openness in the attorney/client relation.
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the process of individual client empowerment may come slowly, and in some
cases never materialize, does not warrant abnegating the undertaking.
Discourse on socio-economic history should focus on enabling clients to
locate themselves on the class map of American society. Client socio-eco-
nomic location entails client study and organized client/client investigation
and reflection.270 The purpose of these joint endeavors is to broaden client
awareness of self as an historical actor within a larger class and community
whole.271
Socio-economic history, even at an elementary level, is vital to the un-
folding of client/client relation. Lacking an informed sense of self and place in
historical context, individual clients may be unable to overcome narrow self-
interest and perceive the common interests of class and shared community.
Thus, they may be unwilling to participate in the united resurrection of that
270. Under Freire's pedagogy, attorney and client act as co-investigators of the thematics
of domination. P. FREIRE, supra note 19, at 97, 68-74, 93-123. Within this joint investigation,
Freire claims "[a]ction and reflection occur simultaneously." Id. at 123. Accordingly,
"[c]ritical reflection is also action." Id.
271. Materials relevant to client socio-economic location span a vast range. In a single
community, these materials should include quantitative data measuring client poverty popula-
tions in terms of age, disability, gender, household composition, income, wealth, and race. Ad-
ditional data highlighting the gravity of community oppression (e.g., alcohol and drug
addiction, battered women, child abuse, crime, hunger, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency,
school truancy and dropout rates, and teenage pregnancy) are also pertinent. Data on federal,
state, and local funding of public resources, including police, fire, sanitation, parks, hospitals,
mental health and drug rehabilitation clinics, and social services are equally germane.
Community socio-economic data should be supplemented by historical materials docu-
menting the evolution of local neighborhoods. Particularly noteworthy are patterns of eco-
nomic development, employment, housing displacement and segregation, and immigration. In
assembling and interpreting this data, efforts should be made to discern and chart factors influ-
encing the growth and decline of neighborhoods. Close attention should be devoted to the role
and effect of public and private initiatives in ameliorating and preserving neighborhood prosper-
ity.
Socio-economic materials also should winnow and synthesize data from national, state, and
adjacent local sources. The goal in distilling these materials is to present an in depth and de-
tailed proffle of client poverty populations. To that end, socio-economic data illuminating the
plight of impoverished communities should be accumulated widely. Data then should be ana-
lyzed comparatively seeking a correlation between communities connected by factors such as
gender, household composition, or race.
Likewise, national, state, and local historical sources should be consulted in tracing client
poverty populations. The similar objective is to delineate the history of a client population that
goes beyond anecdote and myth. See eag., COALITION ON HUMAN NEEDS, How THE POOR
WOULD REMEDY POVERTY (1988); B. LEYSER, A. BLONG, & J. RIGGS, BEYOND THE MYTHS:
THE FAMILIES HELPED BY THE AFDC PROGRAM (2d ed. 1985). By combining soeio-eco-
nomic and historical data, poverty lawyers may be able to compose an accurate account of
client poverty populations specific to local communities and common to larger state and na-
tional communities.
The account should be drafted in conjunction with individual clients and client/commu-
nity groups. Because client populations may vary in literacy skills, the account should be
plainly written with statistical analysis limited to easily grasped illustrations. The account then
should be reviewed with individual clients and organized client/community study groups for
revision. After revision is complete, the account should be circulated among client/community
groups for dissemination. The entire process of drafting and distribution should be client-cen-
tered and, to the extent possible, client-participatory.
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community. Poverty lawyers should work to sharpen client perception of re-
lational community, of individuals acting in mutual affirmation and solidarity
of interest.
D. Client/Community Dialogue
The third moment of dialogue occurs in the sphere of client/community
relation. Like the dialogic moments of attorney/client and client/client rela-
tion, this relation unfolds from mutual affirmation of the client-as-other in
direct and open meeting. This meeting is pluralistic drawing from and coa-
lescing around a community of clients. In that meeting, empowerment of
class and class consciousness is enriched.
To promote client/community relation, the attorney/client dialogue must
branch off into straightforward political discourse.272 This turn transports the
attorney/client relation outside the conventions of dominant traditions to ar-
rive at a political base theory of representation.273 Invoked by Bellow and
amplified by Simon, this theory proposes to bond traditional litigation tactics
to political organizing, protest, and electoral politics, thereby forging an inte-
grated political strategy.274
272. Bellow and Kettleson stress that "[p]olitical organization and activity by disadvan-
taged groups will be necessary to maintain, expand and assure full implementation of any bene-
fits and rights that lawyers might establish." Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 50, at 383-84
(footnote omitted). See Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling". The Law School Clinic and Polit-
ical Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45, 49-53 (1986) (endorsing overt political discourse in clinical
setting); Simon, supra note 157, at 558-59 (studying the political character of lawyering and
advocating a Political Vision); Stumpf, Law and Poverty: A Political Perspective, 1968 Wis. L.
REV. 694, 702-06 (explicating the political dimensions of poverty law, particularly as a commu-
nity instrument and resource).
273. Comment, supra note 159, at 1078 (quoting Bellow). Bellow expounds that "legisla-
tures will make new laws, and executives will enforce new rules, where interest groups exist to
exert continuing pressure." Id. (footnote omitted). For theoretical justification, see D. Ricci,
COMMUNITY POWER AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY: THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1971); R. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971); R. DAHIL, WHO
GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961). Compare S. BOWLES &
H. GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: PROPERTY, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONTRADIC-
TIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT 91 (1986) (describing "the manner in which the power of
capital undermines the liberal promise of autonomous and effective action by individuals and
groups"); G. DOMHOFF, WHO REALLY RULES? NEW HAVEN AND COMMUNITY POWER RE-
EXAMINED (1978) (challenging pluralist conceptions of local and national power structures);
Abel, supra note 55, at 497 (assailing the "apolitical conception of legal aid as simply another
means of fostering liberal pluralism").
274. See Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431,
1499-1513 (1986). Historians contemplating the community action programs of the 1960s con-
firm the efficacy of the Bellow-Simon theory of "legal intervention" as a framework for reform.
P. MARRIS & M. REIN, DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL REFORM: POVERTY AND COMMUNITY ACTION
IN THE UNITED STATES 294 (2d ed. 1973). They wisely point out, however, that this strategy
encountered fierce and ultimately fatal resistence, at both local and national levels, once legal
activists overstepped the "limits of political tolerance." Id. at 293, 164-90. The inherent risk of
political encroachment stands independent of equally nettlesome issues of constituency, coali-
tion, funding, planning, and leadership development. Id. at 56-163. For prospective and retro-
spective assessments of the community action program, compare Cannon, Enlightened
Localism: A Narrative Account of Poverty and Education in the Great Society, 4 YALE L. &
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Reconstituting this theory, Habermas recommends "a new division of
powers within the dimension of social integration" represented by autono-
mous self-organized public spheres of solidarity.275 He contends autonomous
public spheres arise from domains of everyday practice and centers of concen-
trated communication. 76 By means of communication and through forms of
self-organization, Habermas claims the collective capacity for action is
strengthened.2 77
The imperatives of interest group politics and class power compel poverty
lawyers and clients to move towards client community. This movement re-
quires "working with organized groups of poor people, working with or-
ganizers, and occasionally even organizing itself."278 The collaboration of
poverty lawyers, clients, and political organizers in the formation of commu-
nity empowerment groups assigns a tactical role to the traditional methods of
direct service and law reform litigation. Each method "becomes simply one
tactic among many available to poor people's groups.' 2 79
The fundamental rethinking demanded by the unfolding of client/com-
munity dialogue sparks a moment of democratic renewal for poverty lawyers.
Disclaiming marginalizing traditions, they may search dialogically for multi-
dimensional rights issues galvanizing client/community organization at local,
state, and national levels. Collaboratively fashioned, these catalyst2lo rights
PoL'Y REv. 6 (1985) and Sloan, The Community Action Program and the Social Responsibility
of the Local Lawyer, 51 VA. L. REv. 1545 (1965).
275. J. HABERMAS, supra note 37, at 364.
276. Id.
277. For a deepening of Habermas's understanding of critical theory and communicative
action, see R. RODERICK, HABERMAS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRITCAL THEORY 62-173
(1986).
278. Comment, supra note 159, at 1078. See also Failinger & May, supra note 10, at 55
("Group-oriented approaches to legal services recognize that the poor have common interests
and are subjected to class treatment, a reality that suggests the desirability of group legal
responses.").
279. Comment, supra note 159, at 1078 (footnote omitted). The implications of this tacti-
cal organizing approach are significant. Offering an example of this approach in practice, Bach-
mann surmises:
[c]onsider an intersection where the lack of a stop sign is causing traffic hazards and
threatening children. A lawyer would solve this problem by going to court to get the
stop sign put into place. From this process people either do not know how the stop
sign got there or learn that lawyers produce change. Both results aggravate people's
perceptions of their powerlessness, which is disasterous from an organizer's perspec-
tive. In contrast to the lawyer, the organizer would knock on all the doors in the
neighborhood, organize a meeting of interested people, and help them collectively deal
with the problem. They would probably hold a mass demonstration, meet with a city
official, and successfully pressure her to provide the stop sign. From this experience,
people in the neighborhood would learn that they can have power if they organize,
and coordinate their efforts. Because so many individuals participated in producing
the sign, nearly everyone in the neighborhood would learn this lesson. Suddenly an
aspect of the neighborhood is the product of the residents' personal actions.
Bachmann, supra note 60, at 6.
280. Comment, supra note 159, at 1079. Scheingold argues that concentrating litigation
tactics on "building political coalitions and mobilizing resources on behalf of implementation"
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issues may awaken dormant client/community consciousness and mobilize the
building of independent, locally-based client/community empowerment
groups.281
This boldly political object transforms the goal of representation from the
protection and expansion of individual or group entitlement claims to the es-
tablishment of client/client and client/community organization. As Bellow
mentions, this methodological transformation must be accompanied by a re-
orientation of poverty lawyer perspective. He remarks: "The organization's
purpose is to bring about some change in the situation of its members and to
establish some real modification of problems they face. That may involve
changing legal rules; it may not." 28
2
Perceiving traditional litigation methods as tactical organizing tech-
niques283 directs poverty lawyers to adopt a role subordinate to clients in or-
ganizing client/client and client/community empowerment groups. Lawyer
adoption of a subordinate role is crucial to the fecund evolution of these grass
roots organizations. Without the separation of lawyers from leadership posi-
tions, client and community organizations will be fixed to a lawyer-engineered
political strategy.
Commentators have denounced the tendency of poverty lawyers to arro-
gate leadership through domination. That tendency, charged by force of per-
sonality284 and professional training, is anathema to independent group
formation and leadership development.285 Defining the poverty lawyer's role
as secondary to and supportive of client/community empowerment enables
may enable the poor to acquire sufficient autonomy to generate and sustain their own entitle-
ment claims, and hence, reduce their dependency. Scheingold, supra note 56, at 891.
281. Comment, supra note 159, at 1086. See also Abel, supra note 55, at 522 ("Individual
apathy and feelings of impotence can be overcome through organization and collective action,
-but again there are obstacles.").
282. Comment, supra note 159, at 1087 n.28 (quoting Bellow). As Scheingold warns,
without the reorientation of consciousness and commitment to the insurgent "dynamics" of
social change, poverty lawyers will again "become bogged down in litigation tactics that may be
personally gratifying but that are institutionally disruptive and socially inconsequential[.]"
Scheingold, supra note 56, at 888.
283. Comment, supra note 159, at 1087. Bellow and Kettleson admonish:
Unless public interest lawyers find ways of pursuing shorter term legal gains without
encouraging dependency and blunting both individual and organized client initiatives
to deal with their own problems, they will substantially undermine the possibility of
the sorts of political activity essential to any long term resolution of the inequities that
burden their clients.
Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 50, at 384 n.182.
284. On charismatic domination and legitimation of obedience, see Weber, Politics as a
Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 79 (H. Gerth & C. Mills eds.
1946).
285. Commentators decry the "significant dangers" accompanying the involvement of
"middle class lawyers" in organizing the poor.
More articulate, better educated, aggressive by nature and training, some lawyers tend
to dominate newly formed groups, even when they try not to; such dominance, even if
the middle class lawyer has been able to internalize the perspective of the poor, will
generally result in the same dependence on the lawyer which a strategy of test case
litigation inevitably means for the poor. The organization will not develop the aggres-
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her to structure direct service and law reform litigation in accordance with the
priorities set by client/community groups. The generation of litigation initia-
tives activating and reinforcing client/community wholeness must flow from
client/community empowerment groups not poverty lawyers.2 86 The primacy
of these groups assures client/community-centered decisionmaking regarding
the content and direction of group policy. 287
The emergence of client/community empowerment groups permits pov-
erty lawyers to deconstruct more effectively the myths of legal efficacy and
inherent indigent isolation and passivity in transformational client/commu-
nity settings. Because counter hegemony must be constructed from these
mythological ruins, poverty lawyers must simultaneously communicate multi-
dimensional rights theory. Conveying this information is a cardinal element
of empowerment. 28
Multi-dimensional rights education may broaden the historical under-
standing of individual clients, client/client, and client/community groups.
Moreover, rights education may serve to encourage clients to communicate
and share their common complaints with a community of others in like situa-
tions. This dialogue is transformational in its power to invigorate political
organization and mobilization around basic, generally held grievances.
sive and self-confident indigenous leadership that is probably the most effective stimu-
lus to a vigorous membership, and the only lasting basis for the organization's power.
Comment, supra note 159, at 1091 (footnote omitted). See also Abel, supra note 55, at 578-79
(attributing poverty lawyer preference for litigation to "its higher visibility, quicker results, and
greater legitimacy"); J. KATz, supra note 74, at 105-22 (describing law reform litigation as a
"culture of significance").
286. Comment, supra note 159, at 1088. This analysis follows the main outlines of Bel-
low's integrated model of politics. The conceptual precursor of the class advocacy model, based
on "representation of the poor with respect to their common or collective interests," is sketched
in the earlier work of Jerome Carlin and Jan Howard. See Carlin & Howard, LegalRepresenta-
tion and Class Justice, 12 UCLA L. REv. 381, 436 (1965).
287. As Lawrence Grosberg and Deborah Rhode demonstrate, client/community deci-
sionmaking expressed in class actions may be fractured by internal conflicts over divergent liti-
gation interests commonly arising during "settlement or remedial deliberations." Rhode Class
Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1188 (1982). See Grosberg, Class Actions
and Client-Centered Decisionmaking, SYRAcusE L. REV. (1989) (forthcoming); Berger, Away
from the Court House and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L REv.
707 (1978). See also Meeker, Dombrink & Song, Perceptions About the Poor, Their Legal Needs,
and Legal Services, 9 LAW & POL'Y 143 (1987) (finding little similarity between the poverty
community and community organizations concerning resource allocation priorities).
Derrick Bell shows these internal conflicts also may distort the attorney/client relation.
See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976).
288. A.F. Ginger comments:
When a lawyer talks to people about their rights in a fundamental sense, he strength-
ens the individual client and the organizational client to the point where they are
prepared to do things they were afraid to do before. Not that you should tell them
what they should do and should not do. But certainly they should know what the law
says, and something about the history of this society.
Comment, supra note 159, at 1086 n.25 (quoting Ginger, The Movement and the Lawyer, 26
GUILD PRACTIONER 12 (1967)).
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Poverty lawyers can stimulate client organization and community mobili-
zation by drafting self-help advocacy materials, such as legal handbooks and
manuals, which translate the law into a more intelligible and less intimidating
medium.2 89 This translation is particularly cogent if undertaken in the context
of client/community lay advocacy training. Training welfare clients, for in-
stance, to teach others similarly situated about relevant program rules and
regulations or agency procedures instills a provocative lesson in the practice of
collective self-help.290
A more provocative lesson poverty lawyers prudently fear to broach con-
cerns client physical confrontation with oppressive actors, as vividly portrayed
in Williams. This fear, however, exerts an overinclusive chilling effect.
Viewed as the political venting of either aspiration or dissent, individual and
mass confrontation are fundamental to the "process of democratic movement-
building."'29 Because these forms of confrontation are at different times un-
foreseeable and "overarchingly difficult"2 92 to fashion, and at all times danger-
ous, it may be necessary to counsel clients regarding contemplated acts of civil
disobedience or political protest.
The object of confrontation is political incitement. 293 As an incendiary
act of politicization, confrontation may prove essential to community activiza-
289. Wexler, supra note 157, at 1056-57. Expanding on this point, Wexler states:
Having a summary and explanation of the laws which affect their lives means a great
deal to poor people. It means that they have a weapon with which to fight back, and
knowing that they have the weapon builds the security to engage in the fight. Many
poor people do not even know that they have legal rights; very few know the substance
of even their most fundamental rights.
Id. at 1057. For concrete examples, see THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, HOMELESS FAMILY
RIGHTS PROJECT, HOMELESS FAMILIES KNOW YOUR RIGHTS (1987); THE LEGAL AID SOCI-
ETY, COMMUNITY ADVOCATE PROJECT, THE PEOPLE'S GUIDE TO FAIR HEARINGS IN NEW
YORK CITY (1985).
290. Wexler, supra note 157, at 1056-58. Wexler adds:
If properly trained, welfare recipients can help other recipients compute their own
budgets, figure their own available income and resources, succeed at eligibility inter-
views, win fair hearings, negotiate with merchants for credit, lobby for legislative and
administrative changes in welfare, appear before hospital boards, and so on. Most
often poor people can help each other better than lawyers can; they have easier access
to other poor people, know the problems intimately, and can act in ways which law-
yers fear to act.
Id. at 1057.
291. L. GOODWYN, supra note 257, at XVIII (construing "democratic movement-build-
ing" as a four-stage "sequential process" of formation, recruitment, education, and institutional
politicization).
292. Id. at XVII. Where the individual or group client purpose involves civil disobedi-
ence, confidentiality doctrines must be assessed. To accommodate the sometimes clandestine
needs of political confrontation and the professional canons of compelled disclosure, the attor-
ney must fully explain confidentiality to the client not only to avoid misleading her, but also to
permit her to forego legal representation when essential to preserve the act of disobedience
itself. For an elaboration of the obligation to explain confidentiality, see Sobelson, Lawyers,
Clients and Assurances of Confidentiality: Lawyers Talking Without Speaking, Clients Hearing
Without Listening, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 703 (1988).
293. The vagueness of individual and community thresholds of tolerance renders political
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tion and mobilization.29 4 Its value, when effective, lies in its visceral quality of
empowerment as a shared experience of lived political principle."
The poverty lawyer's role in political confrontation is limited. Working
in unison with political organizers and client/community groups, she should
help provide insight into the legal ramifications of a direct action, in specific
the imperiling risk of civil and criminal penalties. In no circumstance should
she participate in that action. Nor should she assume the role of political
counsel on matters of tactics and strategy. Rather she should cabin her activi-
ties to the ken of legal knowledge. Armed with this knowledge, client/com-
munity empowerment groups can prepare and execute confrontational
political actions in light of legally appraised repercussions.
The dialogic moments of attorney/client, client/client, and client/com-
munity relation permit the mutual embrace of individual and collective values
of solidarity.2 96 Solidarity creates community. The creation of democratic
community hinges on "cooperative struggle,"2 97 on the meeting of the poor
"in cooperation in order to transform the world." '298 That transformation re-
incitement an inexact and explosive empowerment device. Cf. J. HABERMAs, supra note 6, at
63 (commenting on the uncertainty of such thresholds).
With respect to protest in an urban community, Martin Luther King, Jr., explains:
To raise protest to an appropriate level for cities, to invest it with aggressive but
nonviolent qualities, it is necessary to adopt civil disobedience. To dislocate the func-
tioning of a city, without destroying it, can be more effective than a riot because it can
be longer lasting, costly to the society, but not wantonly destructive, [sic] Moreover, it
is difficult for government to quell it by superior force.
D. GARROw, supra note 257, at 574 (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr.). See also M. KING,
Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289-302 (J. Washington ed. 1986).
294. See L. GOODWYN, supra note 257, at XVIII-XXIV. On the transformation of black
dissident consciousness generated by litigation and extra-legal protest (e.g., boycotts, sit-ins,
marches, and riots), see Kennedy, supra note 67, at 1064-66.
295. See generally H. RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVFMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP
SOUTH REMEMBERED (1977). Confrontation reflects principled political action embodying a
sense of witness and opposition to injustice. See Margolis, On the Ethical Defense of Violence
and Destruction, Held, On Understanding Political Strikes, Gendin, Governmental Toleration of
Civil Disobedience, and Schochet, The Morality of Resisting the Penalty, in PHILOSOPHY &
POLniTCAL AcTION 52-71, 109-28, 160-96 (V. Held, K. Nielsen, & C Parsons eds. 1972). Even
when marred by bloodshed, it may inspire commitment to further action. As the civil rights
movement demonstrated, confrontation may also stir a sympathetic reaction and support from
peripheral communities. Of course, confrontation may also spiral into inane and seif-destruc-
five acts of violence. See generally K. SALE, SDS (1973); WEATHERMAN (H. Jacobs ed. 1970).
Wexler reiterates this theme of protest, maintaining:
If the people confront those who oppose them and win, they see that they can
beat those whom they will inevitably oppose again. That lesson is more valuable than
anything the lawyer can win, or any ease in his style of victory.
Wexler, supra note 157, at 1058 (footnote omitted).
296. For Unger, the values of solidarity come from the practices and institutions of group
life; their worth stands independent of their use to individual will or combination of individual
wills. R. UNGER, supra note 7, at 29. The subversion of relationships of dependency and domi-
nation, according to Unger, is the "crucial determinant of the progress of equity and solidarity
in law." Id. at 212-13.
297. L. GOODWYN, supra note 257, at XXIII-XXIV.
298. P. FREIRE, supra note 19, at 167.
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quires the unity2 99 of cultural consciousness and political organization where
the poor "see themselves" as a self-liberating class.30 ° Poverty lawyers can
empower liberating consciousness and organization by turning openly to the
poor and jointly engaging in a dialogue about the world.30 '
Poverty lawyers must be circumspect in naming that world. As Unger
reminds us, "[hie who has the power to decide what a thing will be called has
the power to decide what it is. ' 302 Naming, therefore, must be guided by
critical self-reflection and dialogic reciprocity30 3 as well as by allegiance to the
open discourse of diverse community.3 4
Naturally, language, like identity and role, is slow to acquire new mean-
ings. Here, the solution advanced by Unger and Minow is instructive: "use of
old words in new ways. ' 305 This solution, however, is itself vulnerable to
privileging.3 °6 Privileging new forms of discourse may silence different and
opposing voices, thus doing violence to democratic community. Caring for
299. Id. at 172, 173-85.
300. L. GoODWYN, supra note 257, at XXV. To enter that world, the poverty lawyer
must personalize and contextualize the poor client's problems. Menkel-Meadow, supra note
239, at 57-58.
301. P. FREIRE, supra note 19, at 181.
302. R. UNGER, supra note 22, at 80.
303. Dialogic reciprocity hinges on the poverty lawyer's ability to maintain a critical self-
awareness of the "necessary situatedness" of her own standpoint. C. MACKINNON, supra note
229, at 59-60. See also Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal
Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 543, 595-96 (1988)(discussing dialogic reciprocity). With this
understanding of self, the poverty lawyer may gain "some access to the truth of the situation."
C. MACKINNON, supra note 229, at 60.
304. On the chorus of voices and common purposes of community, see R. UNGER, supra
note 22, at 220-25, 249-64.
305. See id. at 16; Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J.
1860 (1987). Naming postulates a reinterpretation and reconstruction of both word and prac-
tice. That reconfiguration is itself an act of empowerment. See Scales-Trent, supra note 41, at
43 ("Naming oneself, defining oneself and thereby taking the power to define out of the hands of
those who wield that power over you, is an important act of empowerment.").
306. Privileged discourse may subordinate differences of class, culture, gender, and race.
See Scales-Trent, supra note 41, at 13 (describing a system of mythology and misinterpretations
degrading the status of black women); Scarborough, Conceptualizing Black Women's Employ-
ment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457, 1458 (1989) (describing the socio-historical and legal
"invisibility" of black women); Williams, Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy
of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31
ARIZ. L. REv. 237 (1989) (discussing discursive themes and practices of European-derived
colonialism and racism); Morris, Stereotypic Alchemy: Transformative Stereotypes and Antids-
crimination Law, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 251 (1989) (examining process of transforming
stereotypic images into vehicles for discrimination); Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Pro-
tection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (analyzing the cul-
tural meaning of racial stereotype).
Minow recognizes the "dilemma of difference" in the multiple contexts of gender, race,
ethnicity, and class, as well as in the evolution of current feminist theory and practice, see The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engenderea, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 12 (1987);
Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988).
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difference in the context of community is the unresolved task of dialogue.3"7
CONCLUSION
The theory of counter hegemonic empowerment entrusts the poor with
the responsibility for their own historical transformation. Twenty-five years of
oftentimes dedicated advocacy have shown poverty lawyers cannot discharge
that responsibility. At best, poverty lawyers can provide particularized aid
and forge piecemeal reform.
The importance of these efforts should not be denigrated. Fending off
hunger and homelessness, even barely or momentarily, is of no small comfort
to those who would otherwise go hungry and homeless. Conversely, winning
selected skirmishes against a looming poverty should not distract poverty law-
yers from larger goals and untoward consequences.
The goal of poverty law should, indeed, must be the abolition of poverty.
By now it seems painfully clear that the traditional methods of poverty law -
direct service and law reform litigation - have fared badly in that abolitionist
effort. The tragedy of this effort lies not in being bested by poverty, but in
running afoul of history.
Poverty lawyers negate the insurgent history of the poor, a history of
dissent and protest, a history of class and class consciousness. This history is
daily rewritten by poverty lawyers bent on unmindfully reifing myths of legal
efficacy and inherent indigent isolation and passivity. By decontextualizing
and atomizing the common struggle of the poor, these revisionist myths deny
the poor a history of individual rebellion and collective solidarity, instead re-
ducing their experience to the demeaning label of dependent client-recipient.
Only by redressing this reductionism, restoring the fullness of historical
experience, and recovering the oppositional continuities of alternative tradi-
tions, can poverty lawyers facilitate the unification of the poor into a class-for-
itself consciously striving to remake the oppressive world of poverty. Remak-
ing this world begins with the transformation of the attorney/client relation,
the dialogic point of connection between poverty lawyers and the poor.
By recasting the attorney/client relation as a direct and open meeting of
mutual affirmation, the historical potential of the poor may unfold. This un-
folding may continue in the meetings of client and client as well as client and
307. See Cornell, The Poststructuralist Challenge to the Ideal of Community, 8 CARuozo
L. REV. 989, 1017-22 (1987) (unpacking the ethic of caring for difference).
The process of dialogic resolution is feminist in employing a method of knowing - con-
sciousness raising - to discern the meaning of difference and exclusion. In the "telling and
sharing of experiences[,]" Menkel-Meadow finds the "potential for breakthrough, transforma-
tion, epiphanies of knowledge, and change and contribution." Menkel-Meadow, Excluded
Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L
REv. 29, 31-32 (1987). The fulfillment of this potential implies the possibility of coercion-free
discourse. Until that possibility is demonstrated, unencumbered by ideological determinations,
the task of dialogue must be left unresolved.
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community. In these dialogic moments of empowerment, the poor make his-
tory happen.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
